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http://www.jstor.orgA Comparative  Model of Bargaining: 
Theory and Evidence 
By  GARY  E BOLTON  * 
Recent laboratory  studies  of alternating-offer  bargaining  find many empirical 
regularities  that are inconsistent  with the standard theory.  In this paper, I 
postulate  that bargainers  behave  as if they  are negotiating  over  both "absolute" 
and "relative"  money.  Absolute  money  is measured  by cash, relative  money  by 
the disparity  between  absolute  measures.  The resulting  model is consistent  with 
previously  observed  regularities.  New experiments  provide  further  support  as well 
as evidence  against  several  alternative  explanations.  Also  finding  some  support  is 
an extension  which  predicts  that the equilibrium  of the standard  theory  will be 
observed  when  bargaining  is done  in a "tournament"  setting.  (JEL C78, C92) 
A  controversy  has developed over what 
role, if any, "fairness"  plays in laboratory 
alternating-offer  bargaining. Experimental 
investigators  have come to markedly  differ- 
ent conclusions  about the ability  of perfect 
equilibrium, in  conjunction with  the  as- 
sumption  that utility is measured  by mone- 
tary  payoffs,  to predict  behavior.  A possible 
role for fairness arises because settlements 
regularly  differ  from those predicted  in the 
direction  of the equal money division. 
Jack Ochs and Alvin E. Roth (1989) sug- 
gest that a model in which utility functions 
contain  an argument  reflecting  tolerance  for 
deviations  from equal divisions  may  be use- 
ful in explaining  these phenomena.  Not ev- 
eryone agrees: 
We strictly  reject the idea to include 
results of analyzing  a social decision 
problem into the utility functions of 
the  interacting  agents.  ...  Further- 
more, all our experiences  from  ultima- 
tum bargaining  experiments indicate 
that subjects do not "maximize"  but 
are guided by sometimes conflicting 
behavioral norms.  The  utility  ap- 
proach necessarily neglects the  dy- 
namic nature of the intellectual pro- 
cess  which subjects apply to  derive 
their decision  behavior.... 
(Werner  Guth and Reinhard  Tietz, 
1990  p. 440). 
Instead, Guth and Tietz favor a model in 
which  bargainers  shift  between strategic  and 
equity  considerations  in a hierarchical  man- 
ner. Still other experimental investigators 
see little or no role for distributional  con- 
cerns. Kenneth Binmore et al. (1985) sug- 
gest that experience is  sufficient to  turn 
"fairmen"  into perfect-equilibrium  "games- 
men." Janet Neelin et al. (1988) conjecture 
that when perfect equilibrium  predicts  inac- 
curately  it is because bargainers  fail to do 
backwards  induction. The  data sets from 
these investigations  are broadly consistent 
with one another;  it is the data interpreta- 
tions that differ.  Ochs and Roth (1989) sur- 
vey these studies and reconcile some of the 
conclusions.  They trace some of the discrep- 
ancies to differences  in the scope of experi- 
mental design and trace others to  differ- 
ences in the focus of the data analysis. 
This paper reports  on experimental  work 
that addresses some of  the  unreconciled 
disparities.  The paper also describes  a com- 
parative  model in which distributional  con- 
cerns are incorporated  into utility  functions. 
While Ochs and Roth (1989) suggested  this 
sort of model, they neither  fully described  it 
nor did a full analysis. 
* Department  of Management  Science, The Smeal 
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The  comparative  model explains previ- 
ously observed  behavior  in some detail. Of 
course, if this were all it could do, it would 
be of marginal  interest:  the litmus  test is the 
veracity  of the model's added implications. 
The comparative  model predicts with con- 
siderable  accuracy  in two previously  unstud- 
ied environments.  Even so, one might  ques- 
tion the prudence  of inserting  distributional 
concerns into  utility functions.1 For  in- 
stance, why not maintain  the conventional 
behavioral  postulate and modify  one of the 
usual suspects (say, the complete-informa- 
tion assumption)?  The answer,  detailed be- 
low, is that observed behavior is in direct 
conflict  with the supposition  that bargainer 
utility is measured exclusively  by monetary 
payoffs (irrespective  of  informational  con- 
siderations),  thereby necessitating  the type 
of modification  embodied in the compara- 
tive model. 
The comparative  model is a modification 
of the conventional  theory, deriving  predic- 
tions, as does the conventional  theory,  from 
utility maximization and  perfect  equilib- 
rium.  Thus, the comparative  model demon- 
strates  that game theory can provide  useful 
explanations  for the behavior observed in 
this  type of  laboratory  bargaining. More 
specifically,  the comparative  model demon- 
strates  that there is a strategic,  as well as a 
"fairness,"  aspect to the way in which sub- 
jects bargain. (Vesna Prasnikar  and Roth 
[1991] draw a  similar conclusion from a 
rather  different  sort of experiment.) 
In the basic  bargaining  environment  to be 
considered,  there are two bargainers,  a and 
/3. They seek mutual agreement  on sharing 
a pie. Attention  will be restricted  to a two- 
period version of  the  model. In the first 
period, a  proposes a  division of  the pie 
which /3 either accepts or rejects. If /3 ac- 
cepts, the pie is divided  in accordance  with 
a's proposal;  otherwise,  the game proceeds 
to the second period, and due to delay, the 
pie shrinks.  Now roles are reversed:  /3  makes 
a proposal.  If a  accepts, the pie is divided 
accordingly;  otherwise, the  game ends in 
"disagreement,"  with both bargainers re- 
ceiving  nothing. 
Alternating-offer  bargaining  of this sort 
has been  analyzed by Ingolf Stahl (1972) 
and Ariel Rubinstein  (1982), among  others. 
The standard  analysis,  which I will refer to 
as  the  pecuniary model,  assumes  that bar- 
gainer  utility  is equivalent  to the amount  of 
pie  that the bargainer receives. The pre- 
dicted outcome, (subgame)  perfect equilib- 
rium, is derived from backwards  induction. 
For example, suppose that the pie is one 
dollar, and suppose that  a  and  /3  have 
respective  discount  factors 8a  and 8,3, both 
contained  on the interval  [0,1]. Consider  the 
subgame beginning in the  second period. 
Since a's utility depends exclusively  on the 
amount  of money he receives,  /3 need offer 
a at most one cent in order to induce a  to 
accept. Consequently, 3  may ask for and 
receive  virtually  the entire dollar.  Now back 
up to the first period. Since 3's utility de- 
pends only on  the  amount of  money he 
receives, a  need offer /3 at most one cent 
more than ,3 can expect from rejecting  and 
moving the game into the second period. 
Bargainer  83's  first-period  valuation  of a sec- 
ond-period  dollar is  8,  dollars. Therefore, 
a's equilibrium  strategy  is to offer 8  dollars 
to  /8 and, if the game goes to the second 
period, to  accept any nonnegative offer. 
Bargainer  3's equilibrium  strategy  is to ac- 
cept any offer of  b  dollars or more, to 
reject  otherwise,  and if the game goes to the 
second period, to offer a no more than one 
cent. So the perfect-equilibrium  allocation 
has a  receiving 8  dollars and /3 receiving 
1 -  N  dollars,  boti in the first  period. 
I.  Experimental  Study:  Test of the 
Pecuniary Model 
I conducted  a laboratory  test of the pecu- 
niary model. One  purpose was to  check 
whether  my experimental  design replicated, 
in qualitative  terms, the  data of previous 
studies  (i.e., Binmore  et al., 1985;  Guth and 
Tietz, 1988; Neelin et al., 1988; Ochs and 
Roth, 1989), which it does. Another pur- 
pose  was  to  generate  benchmark data 
against which new  hypotheses could  be 
IAlthough  this  is  by  no  means  a  novel  approach. 
Harold M. Hochman and James D. Rodgers (1969) is a 
significant example. 1098  THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW  DECEMBER 1991 
TABLE  1-EXPERIMENTAL  DESIGN 
Structure  (8a8  ,1)  =(2  1)  (8a8  ,1)  =(I  9) 
Direct money split  cell 1:  cell 2: 
inexperienced, 16 subjects  inexperienced, 14 subjects 
cell 4: 
experienced, 14 subjects 
(10 from cell 1, 4 from cell 2) 
Tournament  cell 5:  cell 6: 
inexperienced, 14 subjects  inexperienced, 14 subjects 
cell 7:  cell 8: 
experienced, 12 subjects  experienced, 14 subjects 
(7 from cell 5, 5 from cell 6)  (5 from cell 5, 9 from cell 6) 
Structural variation  cell 3 (rotating positions):  cell 10 (truncation): 
inexperienced, 12 subjects  inexperienced, 16 subjects 
cell 9 (truncation): 
inexperienced, 16 subjects 
tested (reported on below). A summary  of 
these experiments  is placed at this point in 
the exposition  in order to demonstrate  how 
the new hypotheses are suggested by the 
data. 
A.  Design and Methodology 
The  original experiment comprised ten 
cells, each distinguished  by three treatment 
variables: structure, subject experience, and 
discount factors  (see  Table  1). The  games 
played in cells 1 and 2 conform  precisely  to 
the alternating-offers  structure  described  in 
the Introduction.  This structure  will be re- 
ferred to as the  direct money split. Subjects 
who participated  in cells 1 and 2 were inex- 
perienced  (i.e., the subjects  had no previous 
experience with  bargaining experiments). 
Nor did any subject  who participated  in cell 
1 participate  in cell 2. The discount  factors 
used in cell 1 were (8a,  8,) = (2, 1); in cell 2, 
(8a,8p)=(1  2). 
The basic design  of cells 1 and 2 is due to 
Ochs and Roth (1989):  the "pie" is a prede- 
termined  amount  of money  which, in accor- 
dance with the  relevant discount factors, 
diminishes  from one period to the next. To 
implement unequal discount factors, sub- 
jects negotiate  over how to split an interme- 
diate commodity:  100 "chips."  In both cells 
1 and 2, the period-1  value of each chip to 
each bargainer was $0.12. In  cell  1, the 
period-2 value for  a  was $0.08, and the 
value for 3 was $0.04; these were reversed 
in cell 2. 
For the sake of brevity, the pecuniary- 
model perfect equilibrium  will be referred 
to  as  the  pecuniary  equilibrium. Table  2 
identifies the pecuniary  equilibria  for both 
cells 1 and 2. Multiple  equilibria  are due to 
the discrete  nature  of the pie. 
With the noted exceptions,  the methodol- 
ogy was the same for all 10 cells: all obser- 
vations for a given cell were collected in a 
single  session.2  Subjects  were recruited  from 
the undergraduate  population of Carnegie 
Mellon University.3  Cash was the only in- 
centive offered.4 In  order to  participate, 
subjects  had to appear  at a special  time and 
2The longest session was 1 hour and 15 minutes, the 
shortest was 45 minutes, and the average was approxi- 
mately 1 hour. Cells 1-4,  9, and 10 began at 3:30 P.M. 
Cells  5-8  began  at  3:00  P.M.  All  cells  were  run  on 
weekdays, between 20 April and 15 September 1989. 
3Participants for cells 1-4  were recruited from vari- 
ous undergraduate economics classes. Most of the par- 
ticipants  in  cells  5-10  were  recruited  via  university 
bulletin boards, and the  rest were  recruited from un- 
dergraduate economics classes. Of the 102 participants, 
all but two were undergraduates. Of the two that were 
not,  one  was  a graduate student  in public policy and 
engineering  (participated  in  cells  1  and  4),  and  the 
other was a graduate student in mechanical engineer- 
ing (participated in cells 6-8). 
4Subjects were  told explicitly that this was the only 
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TABLE 2-MODEL  PREDICTIONS  AND TESTS, DIRECT MONEY SPLIT 
A. Predictions: 
Pecuniary model  Both models  Comparative model 
1  =  4  =  $3.96-$4.08  A1,  A4  < $6.00 (50 chips)  A2  < $7.92 (66 chips) 
(33-34  chips) 
A2  =  $7.92-$8.04  A1,  A4  < /2 
(66-67  chips) 
B. Tests: 
Hypothesis (H0)  t statistic  d.f. 
$4.08  1.658  7.00 
A4  =  $4.08  3.382  6.00 
,.t 2 $6.00  -  8.447  7.00 
A4  2 $6.00  -  8.847  6.00 
A2  2 $7.92  -  12.580  6.00 
1-kl =  A4  0.878  12.84 
/1  2  2  -5.510  12.98 
A4  2 A2  -5.131  11.93 
Notes:  The  observed  opening  offer  in  cell  i  is  denoted  ,u'.  All  t  statistics  were 
calculated using means and standard errors from the last round of the cell(s). Welch's 
two-mean test was used for two-mean comparisons (see  Peter J. Bickel and Kjell A. 
Doksum,  1977 pp. 218-9). 
place. After random seating, they read di- 
rections (see Appendix B).s This was fol- 
lowed by 10-15 minutes of practice games 
with the computer  as bargaining  partner.  As 
subjects were aware, the computer gener- 
ated random  (hence meaningless)  offers  and 
responses.6  After practice, important por- 
tions of  the  directions (italicized in  Ap- 
pendix B) were read aloud, and all chip 
values were  publicly announced. Finally, 
subjects  were assigned  a and 3 roles (equal 
numbers  of each). These did not change  for 
the duration of the cell (except in cell 3, 
where roles were alternated). 
As subjects  were apprised,  each a anony- 
mously played each  /3 exactly once. The 
computer communicated  all offers and re- 
sponses. It  computed and  displayed the 
monetary  value of offers, whether actually 
made or just under consideration.  Also dis- 
played was  the  history of  the  game  in 
progress (for a facsimile of a typical com- 
puter screen see Appendix  B).7 First-period 
proposals  and tentative  second-period  coun- 
teroffers appeared on the screen together. 
Bargainers  playing /3 sent first-period  rejec- 
tions  and second-period counteroffers si- 
multaneously.  At  the  end  of  each game, 
subjects recorded the complete game his- 
tory (blank  in Appendix  B), making  it avail- 
5Because  of  differences  in  treatment variables, di- 
rections necessarily differed across cells. The directions 
presented in Appendix B are a composite. 
6During  practice,  the  computer  and  the  subject 
would  take turns at the  roles  of  a  and  P3.  When  the 
computer was  called  upon  to  respond  to  a proposal, 
"accept" and "reject" would be  randomly chosen,  re- 
gardless of  what  the  actual proposal  was.  When  the 
computer was called upon to propose, a random-num- 
ber  generator would  produce  a proposal of  the  form 
(x, 100 -  x). One might worry that this procedure would 
bias  participants  toward  making  Pareto-optimal  pro- 
posals.  However,  the  previous  studies  cited  in  this 
paper  provide  overwhelming  evidence  that  subjects 
would do so anyway. 
7The facsimile in Appendix B pertains to the direct 
money split. The only alterations made for the tourna- 
ments were  that chip values were  measured in points 
and at the conclusion of each game the  total points a 
participant had made  during the  experiment was  dis- 
played.  The  only  alteration  made  for  the  structural- 
variation cells was that in cells  9 and  10, a's  second- 
period option to accept or to reject was eliminated. 1100  THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW  DECEMBER 1991 
able for later reference. Subjects had no 
access to information  about games in which 
they were not participants.8  At the conclu- 
sion of the session, two games were ran- 
domly chosen for immediate  cash payment 
of  earnings (tournament  payoffs were dif- 
ferent:  see Section III-C).9 
Investigators  must always be  concerned 
that superfluous  aspects  of the experimental 
design might affect the results (this is true 
in all experimental  sciences).  The remedy  is 
to repeat  the experiment,  varying  the super- 
fluous aspects. Therefore, while the basic 
design follows Ochs and Roth (1989), de- 
tails of my experiment  differed.  For one, no 
fee was paid to subjects  for arriving  on time. 
This was done because some commentators 
had expressed  concern  that Ochs and Roth's 
data might reflect subjects'  interest in the 
fee rather  than the bargaining  payoffs.  Sec- 
ond, discount  factors  were altered in such a 
way that the pecuniary  equilibria and the 
fifty-fifty  money division are spread rela- 
tively  farther  apart.  This was done to make 
it easier to interpret  opening offers. Third, 
chip values and the number of rounds for 
which subjects  were actually  paid were cho- 
sen so that the expected value of a given 
proposal  was about the same across experi- 
ments (actually  a bit higher in mine),10  but 
the probability  that the proposal  would ac- 
tually  be paid on was higher  in mine (25-29 
percent compared  to 10 percent). This ad- 
dresses, at least partially,  the concern that 
subjects  in the Ochs and Roth study might 
not have taken certain situations  too seri- 
ously because of a low probability  that they 
would matter, cashwise.  (See Sections II-E 
and Ill-C  for additional, strong evidence 
that this is not a problem.) 
B.  Results 
The  pecuniary model  suggests a  data 
analysis along  several dimensions. Point 
predictions  are made about first-period  of- 
fers.  In addition,  there are predictions  about 
what should happen if play deviates from 
the equilibrium  path: about conditions  un- 
der which P should reject and about what 
the subsequent  counteroffer  should  be. 
Begin with first-period  offers: Figure 1 
provides a  graphical comparison  of  cell-1 
mean observed  opening offers with the pe- 
cuniary  equilibrium.  Figure  2 does the same 
for cell 2. For cell 1, the hypothesis that 
last-round  means are the same as the equi- 
librium  cannot be rejected at the 0.05 level 
of significance,  but it is rejected  at the 0.025 
level. For cell 2, the hypothesis  can be re- 
jected at all conventional  levels (see Table 2 
for the  t  statistics). In  fact, cell-2 mean 
offers are consistently  less than half the pie, 
even though pecuniary  equilibrium  calls for 
an offer of about two-thirds.  Note that, for 
both cells, the deviations are in the direc- 
tion of the equal money  split. 
It  might be  argued that the  proposed 
offers, in cell  1 at least, are close to the 
pecuniary  equilibrium,  statistics  aside. After 
all, the difference  between the equilibrium 
and the last-round  mean is only about  $0.50, 
not a big difference,  particularly  when one 
considers  that offers must be made in $0.12 
intervals.  The following  explanation  is seem- 
ingly  consistent  with the pecuniary  model:  if 
the game should go to the second period, 
and assuming  that a  prefers ending in dis- 
agreement to  accepting nothing, p  must 
offer a a fraction  of the pie. It would  be no 
surprise if  this fraction were higher than 
$0.04 (one  chip). Using a  slightly higher 
value than $0.04 will alter the backwards- 
induction calculation by a  small amount, 
hence the observed slight deviation. How- 
ever, the explanation  implies  that the devia- 
tions should be consistently  negative,  while 
the observed  deviations  are consistently  pos- 
itive. This inconsistency,  combined  with the 
very substantial  deviations  observed in cell 
2, suggests  that an alternative  explanation  is 
necessary.  Others  will be considered  below. 
Next,  consider data  on  rejections and 
counteroffers  (see Figs. 3, 4). In both cells, 
about 20 percent of all opening offers were 
rejected. Rejections are not on the pecu- 
niary-equilibrium  path, nor are disadvanta- 
8In  the tournaments,  however, final point counts 
were publicly  announced  (without attribution)  at the 
completion  of the session. 
9The average  payout  was slightly  less than $10. 
10If expected values are prorated  for the running 
time of the experiment,  they are much  higher  for mine. VOL. 81 NO. 5  BOL TON: COMPARATIVE  MODEL OF BARGAINING  1101 
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FIGURE 3.  REJECTED  OFFERS: (8A, &,3)  =  (2,  1) 
geous  counteroffers  (second-period  offers 
that give the ,3 proposer less money than 
the first-period  offer he rejects). In cell 1, 
85  percent of  rejected first-period offers 
were  followed by  disadvantageous  coun- 
teroffers. For  cell  2,  the  figure  is  20 
percent.'1  This behavior  was not restricted 
to a very  few: disadvantageous  counteroffers 
were made by a majority  of cell-1 ,B bar- 
gainers,  no one being responsible  for a very 
large proportion  (Fig. 3). Finally, note the 
high percentage  of second-period  rejections. 
This is  so  in spite of  the fact that most 
second-period  offers  gave a a positive,  often 
lIt  is not surprising  that a smaller proportion  of 
first-period  rejections  in cell 2 are followed  by disad- 
vantageous  counteroffers:  In cell 2, a's almost always 
offered O's less than the pecuniary  equilibrium,  and 
vice versa  in cell 1. This almost  always  leaves  room  for 
advantageous  counteroffers  in cell 2 but almost never 
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2: 1  ,1 = 2 disadvantageous  counterproposers:  1 per proposer 
FIGURE 4.  REJECTED  OFFERS: (8,  la')  =  (,  2) 
substantial,  number of  chips (average for 
both cells was about  25). 
At the very least, there are many  discrep- 
ancies between the data and the pecuniary- 
model predictions. The  data are not un- 
usual: they are qualitatively  consistent  with 
previously  cited studies. It will be useful to 
have a summary  of the common  regularities 
(first  enumerated  by Ochs and Roth [1989]). 
Rl:  There is a consistent  first-mover  advan- 
tage: a bargainers  receive  more than 8 
bargainers,  regardless  of the value of 
3. 
R2: Observed  mean opening offers deviate 
from the pecuniary  equilibrium  in the 
direction  of the equal money division. 
R3: A substantial  proportion  of first-period 
offers are rejected. 
R4: A  substantial proportion of  rejected 
first-period  offers are followed by dis- 
advantageous  counteroffers. 
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Ochs and Roth study  had sufficient  scope to 
capture.  Recall that, by the pecuniary  equi- 
librium,  the proportional  allocation should 
be dependent  exclusively  on the value of  ,. 
R5:  The  value  of  8a  influences  the  out- 
come. 
Disadvantageous  counteroffers  appear to 
be the key to understanding  why  the empiri- 
cal data differ from the pecuniary  model's 
predictions:  a key auxiliary  assumption  of 
the  model is  that each bargainer's  utility 
corresponds  to his monetary  payoff. If this 
is true, then disadvantageous  counteroffers 
should never be observed,  and the model's 
predictions  should follow easily (at least in 
the two-period  model, where the backwards 
induction is trivial). However, disadvanta- 
geous counteroffers  are observed in rela- 
tively  large numbers  in all of the cited stud- 
ies.  Note  that no  amount of  incomplete 
information  will explain this: when subjects 
make disadvantageous  counteroffers, they 
have  sufficient  information  to know  that they 
are turning down money. Other explana- 
tions come to mind, but as discussed  in the 
next section,  many  are either  in conflict  with 
the data or theoretically  problematic. 
C.  Some Plausible, but Flawed, Hypotheses 
About Disadvantageous Counteroffers 
It might  be thought  that disadvantageous 
counteroffers are  evidence  that  subjects 
were confused by the experimental  design. 
In particular,  p bargainers  may have com- 
mitted themselves to rejecting  opening of- 
fers before considering  feasible counterof- 
fers, or  maybe subjects made calculation 
errors when translating  chips into money. 
However,  in my  experiments,  as well as those 
of Ochs and Roth (1989), Guth and Tietz 
(1988), and Neelin et al. (1988), counterof- 
fers appeared on the computer screen (or 
message paper) along with the original  of- 
fers, before any commitment  was made on 
the part of f3. In my experiment,  the com- 
puter calculated  the value of every  proposal 
for both players, and it  appeared on the 
screen whenever  the proposal  did. (Further 
evidence  that subjects  understood  the game 
on a cognitive level is detailed in Appen- 
dix C.) 
Another  possibility  is that bargainers  pre- 
fer disagreement  to accepting  offers  that are 
"insultingly  low." However, as  Ochs and 
Roth point out, this does not explain  why a 
bargainer  would reject an offer and come 
back with one that gives him less money. If 
anything, the  argument, unembellished, 
would seem  to  rule out  disadvantageous 
counteroffers. 
A  more subtle version of the last argu- 
ment conjectures  that bargainers  prefer dis- 
agreement to  receiving less than $x  and, 
because of the value of the discount  factors, 
the second-period  pie is worth less than $x 
to at least one bargainer.  As a consequence, 
this bargainer  does not care about the sec- 
ond-period  pie, and disadvantageous  coun- 
teroffers  are simply  evidence of the result- 
ing  capricious behavior. This  argument, 
however, implies that  the  bargaining re- 
duces to  a  one-period demand game. It 
follows  that the opening  equilibrium  offer is 
$x  regardless of  the values of  bargainer 
discount  factors.  However,  definite shifts in 
opening  offers  are observed  as discount  fac- 
tors are varied  in all of the relevant  studies 
(compare  cells 1 and 2 in Figs. 1 and 2; see 
Guth  and  Tietz, 1988;  Ochs  and Roth, 1989). 
The above argument  might be taken one 
step further:  perhaps  the money  involved  in 
the experiment  as a whole is not enough to 
induce subjects  to take it seriously.12  In the 
lab, I manipulated  the structure  of the basic 
bargaining  game in several  ways.  In some of 
these  variations, disadvantageous coun- 
teroffers virtually disappear (see  Sections 
II-E and III-C).  The payoffs  were compara- 
ble across  all variations,  implying  that some- 
thing  else is responsible  for disadvantageous 
counteroffers.  Also, if subjects  did not take 
the game seriously,  one would expect to see 
erratic  behavior  in the data. This is not the 
12The  question  of whether  the amount  of money  is 
sufficient  to induce  subjects  to take the game seriously 
is distinct  from the question  of what would happen  if 
the stakes  were raised.  The latter  question  is discussed 
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case. Indeed, the consistency  of the data, 
not only within  the various  experiments,  but 
across them, is quite remarkable  (for a dis- 
cussion  see Ochs and Roth [1989]). 
In some studies, including  mine, subjects 
negotiated in round-robin  style. While they 
never played  the same person twice, each I3 
bargainer  played  the same set of a bargain- 
ers. It might be argued that either the a's 
or B3's  are colluding  via "feedback  effects." 
For instance, suppose that perfect equilib- 
rium calls for 83  to receive one-third  of the 
first-period  pie. A  83  bargainer  might reject 
offers of less than, say, 40 percent of the 
pie,  thinking that this will  influence the 
rejected a  bargainers  to play softer in the 
future to the benefit of all 83  bargainers.  A 
similar argument can be  fashioned for a 
collusion  when a's equilibrium  share of the 
pie is less than 50 percent. This argument 
has the unraveling  problem  that most collu- 
sion arguments  have when applied to finite 
games. Moreover, it  is  quite awkward  to 
argue  that /3 bargainers  are colluding  when 
it is observed that they receive more than 
their perfect-equilibrium  share  while a bar- 
gainers are colluding  when the situation is 
reversed. 
D.  Experience  Hypothesis 
From  examining  Figure  1 it might  be con- 
jectured that, at the conclusion of play in 
cell 1, subjects  are still learning  (i.e., behav- 
ior has not yet stabilized).  Specifically,  there 
is  a  downward trend to  opening offers, 
which, if it continued,  might lead to pecu- 
niary equilibrium  play. How a learning ar- 
gument  would apply  to cell 2 is less appar- 
ent (compare  Fig. 2). Nevertheless,  one can- 
not dismiss  out-of-hand  the hypothesis  that 
more experience might lead to pecuniary- 
model results, or  at  least to  results that 
differ substantially from  the  less-experi- 
enced case. 
Cell 4 was designed with the experience 
hypothesis  in mind. Experienced  bargainers 
were recruited  by first  inviting  all cell-1 par- 
ticipants.  They were given first priority  be- 
cause the cell-4 bargaining  game is identical 
to that in cell 1 (same discount  factors).  It 
was necessary  to recruit  a few subjects  from 
cell 2.13 These were telephoned in random 
order, until the desired number  of subjects 
was obtained  (see Table 1 for numbers).14"15 
Except for subject  experience,  cells 1 and 4 
are identical in terms of both methodology 
and design. In particular,  bargainer roles 
for cell 4 were randomly  assigned. 
Comparing  cells 1 and 4 provides  a test of 
the experience hypothesis.  As indicated in 
Table 2 and displayed  in Figure 1, the aver- 
age observed  opening offers for each round 
of cell 4 are virtually  identical to those of 
the  final rounds of  cell  1. The  standard 
errors  are smaller  for cell 4 than for cell 1, 
making  it possible to reject the hypothesis 
of pecuniary-equilibrium  play in cell 4 at all 
conventional  levels of significance. 
Contrary to  the  experience hypothesis, 
this suggests that play has "stabilized"  by 
the end of cell 1, away  from the pecuniary 
equilibrium.  However,  note that the aggre- 
gate data on rejections  and disadvantageous 
counteroffers  are very similar  for both cells 
(Fig. 3). While this is clear evidence against 
the hypothesis  that experience  will produce 
pecuniary  play, it might also be  taken as 
evidence against  the argument  that play has 
stabilized.  However, if one rejects the idea 
that subjects  are playing  equilibrium,  it is no 
longer clear what is meant by "stabilized." 
A  discussion of what this might mean, as 
well as whether  players  are doing it, is post- 
poned until Section II-C. The conclusion  to 
be drawn  here is that experience does not 
seem to produce  pecuniary  play, nor does it 
lead to  any substantial  changes, with the 
exception of the shrinking  of standard  er- 
rors. (In a personal communication,  Alvin 
E. Roth has informed  me that he and Clau- 
dia Garcia have obtained very similar re- 
sults using experienced  subjects.) 
13With  one exception, all cell-1 participants  that 
could be contacted agreed to return. The one who 
could  not said she had a scheduling  conflict  but offered 
to return  at another  time. 
14After the running  of cell 1, one of the computer 
terminals  broke  and  was not repaired  for many  months. 
As a result,  for cells 2-8, the maximum  feasible  num- 
ber of subjects  fell from 16 to 14. 
15Subjects  were not previously  told that they would 
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E.  Simple Fairness Hypotheses 
It might be  argued that the  deviations 
from pecuniary  equilibria  observed in cells 
1, 2, and 4 are due to equity  considerations 
implicit  in the experimental  design.  At least 
two distinct testable hypotheses fall under 
this heading.  One hypothesis  states that play 
deviates in  the  direction of  the  fifty-fifty 
money split because of  an  asymmetry  of 
opportunity;  for example, /3 bargainers  in 
cell 1 never get to be  a  bargainers,  thus 
putting them at  a  strategic disadvantage. 
The /8 bargainers  react to this by demand- 
ing more than the  pecuniary equilibrium 
prescribes to  them. According to  this hy- 
pothesis, if each player had an equal num- 
ber of  opportunities to  be  a,  as well as 
/3, pecuniary equilibrium  should result. A 
second hypothesis  states that, by randomly 
assigning  subjects  to be a or /3, the experi- 
menter is inadvertently  suggesting  fair out- 
comes to the subjects  (i.e., the experimenter 
is treating  subjects  in an egalitarian  manner, 
thereby  influencing  subjects  to act similarly; 
for an example  of this sort of phenomenon, 
see  Elizabeth Hoffman and  Matthew L. 
Spritzer  [1982, 1985]). 
Both hypotheses  are tested in cell 3, which 
was identical to cell 1 with the exception 
that subjects  rotated  between a and f3 roles. 
Twelve subjects  played 11 rounds. No sub- 
ject  played any other subject more than 
once. In the first ten rounds, each subject 
was an a  half the time and a f3 the other 
half. Subjects strictly alternated roles for 
the first  six rounds  (because  of the nature  of 
the permutations,  strict alternation is not 
possible  beyond  six rounds).  In the 11th and 
last round, roles were randomly  picked by 
the computer.16 
The test is this: if either of the fairness 
hypotheses  is correct,  then cell-3 data  should 
be closer to pecuniary  equilibrium  than cell- 
1 data. If neither the asymmetry  of design 
nor the randomization  has any impact,  then 
cell-3 and cell-1 data should  be very similar. 
The  influence of  broader experience on 
Rotating  Positions 
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cell-3 subjects  is controlled  for by the cell-4 
comparison.17 
Figure  5 graphically  summarizes  the data 
on cell-3 opening offers. Note that, except 
for the spiked  nature  of the averages  (which 
is explained by the alternating  roles), the 
graph  is very similar  to that for cell 1 (Fig. 
1). In fact, Welch's two-mean test of the 
hypothesis  that Al  =  A3  results  in a t statis- 
tic of  -0.8208  with 8.39 degrees of free- 
dom, so the hypothesis  cannot be rejected 
at any conventional  level of significance.18 
As shown in Figure 6, the statistics  for re- 
jections and disadvantageous  counteroffers 
for the two cells are also very similar.  Note 
that fully 100 percent of the counteroffers 
for cell 3  are disadvantageous.  From this 
evidence, it would not appear that rotating 
the first-mover  role has much impact on 
bargainer  behavior,  leading to the rejection 
of both hypotheses. 
II.  The Comparative Model 
A.  Intuition 
There  is  an  explanation  for  disadvanta- 
geous counteroffers that is consistent with a 
wide range of  empirical observations,  in- 
cluding  R1-R5: contrary  to an auxiliary  as- 
sumption  of the pecuniary  model, bargain- 
ers care about the relative  split of money as 
well as their own cash payoff. Put another 
way, bargainers  measure what they receive 
by both an absolute and a relative yardstick. 
The  absolute  yardstick measures  the  cash 
payoff. The  relative yardstick measures  the 
disparity  between the two bargainers'  abso- 
lute measures  (no altruism:  utility  is nonde- 
creasing in  the  relative measure's self- 
favorability).  Although  cash is the only com- 
modity involved  in negotiations,  bargainers 
act as if there are two: absolute  and relative 
money. It is assumed that bargainers  find 
the monies substitutable  for one  another. 
The explanation  for disadvantageous  coun- 
teroffers  (R4) is immediate:  bargainers  are 
trading away absolute money in  order to 
gain relative  money. 
As shown  in the next section,  the compar- 
ative model offers partial explanations  for 
why settlements consistently  deviate in the 
direction of the equal money division  (R2) 
as well as for the first-mover  advantage  (R1). 
The  complete-information  comparative 
model also explains  virtually  all of the shifts 
in mean offers observed  by Guth and Tietz 
(1988), Ochs and Roth, and myself when 
bargainer  discount factors were varied (in- 
cluding R5). An  extension to  incomplete 
information,  presented in the next section, 
explains rejected first-period  offers (R3). I 
first  present the model with complete infor- 
mation so as not to distract  from the main 
thrust  driving  the results:  an explanation  for 
disadvantageous  counteroffers. 
B.  Formal Model 
Consider a  two-period alternating-offer 
bargaining  game in which the pie is worth k 
dollars.  Let a and ,3 be the respective  first- 
and second-period proposers. Offers take 
the  form  (xa,X  I)  where  Xa+x<1.  Let 
5a  e  3((0,1]  be  the respective per-period 
discount  factors,  so, for example,  an offer of 
(Xa, x13)  is worth  kXa dollars  to a in the first 
period,  but only  ,akXa dollars  in the second 
period. 
Bargainers  receive  utility  from  two 
sources.  One source  is the amount  of money 
obtained from the  settlement. The  other 
source is a relative comparison  of money 
earnings,  incorporated  into the utility func- 
tion by way of a proportional  index: 
{1  if  xn  =  Xn  0 
in,t(X,X0)  =  t  otewXs  a 
l  nt-l  otherwise 
17Close readers of  Binmore  et  al. (1985) may take 
up those authors' assertion that it is the type of experi- 
ence  acquired, not experience per se, which makes for 
a perfect-equilibrium "gamesman." They may feel  that 
cell  3  is  a  stronger test  of  the  experience  hypothesis 
and that the test in cell 4 is inadequate or inappropri- 
ate. These  readers are welcome  to apply this interpre- 
tation. 
18The test was done using the round-8 average from 
cell  1  and  the  round-10  average  of  cell  3.  If  the 
round-11 average from cell 3 is substituted instead, a t 
statistic of  -0.7370  with 9.41 degrees  of  freedom  re- 
sults, and again the  hypothesis is not  rejected  at any 
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where t e (1,2) is the period of settlement 
and n E {fa,,8}.  Note that in,  t E [O, +  ?]. 
Bargainers  a and fB's  utility  from a settle- 
ment of (xa, Xp,)  in period t are respectively 
given  by 
A(St-  lx,k,Xiat  A&jxa  k,a,t) 
and 
B(`  lxpk, i  t 
which are assumed to  have the following 
characteristics. 
ASSUMPTION  1: A  and B are continuous 
and right-differentiable  in both arguments. 
ASSUMPTION  2: A1 > 0 and B1  > 0. 
ASSUMPTION 3: For all jn,t  < 19  A2  >  0 
and B2 >  O, where n = a,/3  and t = 1,2. 
ASSUMPTION  4:  If  8t-jx*  >  8S-lx** 
and  ia,t(t  1x*)2  1,  then A(8t-1x*k,ia,t) 
> A(s-  lx**k  ia,s),  where  s, t E (1,2);  if 
t_X*  1x>  3  lx3*  and ip,t(5`  lx*)  ?  1, then 
B(3`  lx*k,i,  t)>  B(s-lx**k,i,,,s) 
Assumption  2 says that, all other things 
equal,  bargainers  prefer  more  money  to less. 
Assumption  3 says  that the closer  the split is 
to fifty-fifty,  the better off is the bargainer 
who receives the smaller share. For exam- 
ple,  suppose a  receives $2. Then, he  is 
better off when 83  receives $4 than when 83 
receives  $5. On the other hand,  Assumption 
4 states that, if a bargainer  receives a share 
that is larger than or equal to  the share 
received by his partner, the  only way to 
make him better off is to increase  his money 
holdings.  Put another  way, once he obtains 
parity, a bargainer's  only concern is with 
absolute  money.  The latter interpretation  is 
formalized  in the following  lemma  (proof in 
Appendix  A). 
LEMMA 1: A2 = 0  and B2 = 0  whenever 
in,t1,  wheren=a,,3  and t=1,2. 
Figure 7 illustrates  the type of preferences 
a,2  indifference 
cu rve 
8  X  /  5 (1 X  aa a~  a 
1  - ---  --  --  - --  --  - ---  --  --  --  -'-  --  --  -'--1 
comparative 
equilibrium  offer 
1-0)  1  Xa 
2a 
FIGURE  7.  SECOND-PERIOD  a INDIFFERENCE 
CURVES 
described.  Evidence  supporting  the assump- 
tions made about i is discussed in Section 
II-E. 
As with the pecuniary  model, (subgame) 
perfection  will be used as the solution con- 
cept. It will be clear from the analysis  that, 
starting in  any subgame, all  equilibrium 
splits,  (x', x3), satisfy  x' + x3 = 1. It is con- 
venient to assume this up front because it 
allows  for a simplification  of the notation:  a 
period-t  equilibrium offer  is  completely 
characterized by  wOt,  the  proportion of  the 
pie that /8  will receive if the offer is ac- 
cepted (then, the proportion  that a receives 
is 1-wt). 
The  (subgame) perfect  equilibrium is 
characterized  by two equations, both de- 
rived from backwards  induction: suppose 
that the first-period  offer is turned  down  by 
,3, who then must make a  second-period 
offer.  Since a can achieve  utility  level A(O,  1) 
by turning  down ,3's offer (both bargainers 
leave the game with nothing), ,3's second- 
period equilibrium  offer,  c  2'  must satisfy 
(1)  A(8  1-  k  aa(1"  2k)2)) 
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Equation (1) has an " = " sign, not  a  " > " 
sign, because (i)  in  equilibrium,  ,B never 
offers a  more than necessary and (ii) by 
Assumption 1, A  is continuous  in  W2  (see 
Fig. 7). 
Furthermore, ,B will  accept  a's  first- 
period offer, (01,  only if 8  receives at least 
as much utility from a's  offer as she can 
expect by rejecting  and receiving  CW2: 
(2)  B(  lk,  &1) 
=  B(85co2k,is,2(  2)) 
Equation  (2)  involves  an  "="  sign,  not  a 
">"  sign,  for  reasons  analogous  to  those 
given for (1). 
Equation  (2) can be simplified:  define x42 
by  8a(1  x)=8  x  that  is,  x4* is  the 
second-period spfit that  gives each  bar- 
gainer the same amount of money. Thus, 
ia,2(x*)  =  1.  Monotonicity  implies  that 
A(8a(l  -x*),  1)> A(0, 1), so in the second 
period, P  need never offer a  more than 
1-x*;  that  is,  C02  >  4.  Consequently,  it 
is always  the case that i,,,2(cW2)  1, and by 
Lemma  1,  B(5,p2k,iP,2(c2))=B(,W  (2k,  1). 
Thus, (2) becomes 
(2')  B(o,k,  1_c1)=B(P2k1). 
PROPOSITION 1: There exists  Wl,  &)2 E 
[0,1] satisfying (1) and (2'). Further, if  0 < 
8a  and S, <1,  then (CO)1,2)  is the unique 
subgame-perfect-equilibrium  strategy combi- 
nation and  wo is the unique subgame-perfect- 
equilibrium  allocation.'9 
(See Appendix  A for the proof.) Regulari- 
ties Rl  and R2 are partially  explained by 
the next proposition. 
PROPOSITION  2:  If  8,  ?  2  then wi  <  8S; 
if  3  <  2,  then C)1 <  2 
PROOF: 
Statement  1: Since c2  < 1, then 8,&c2  <  8 
Then,  by  monotonicity,  B(8,k,  1) > 
B(GSPco2k,  1). Using the continuity  of B, this 
implies that (2') is satisfied  by wi < 8S. The 
proof of statement  2 is analogous. 
Proposition  2 predicts that the settlement 
will deviate from the pecuniary  equilibrium 
in the direction of the equal money split 
when 8, >  ?.  The direction  of deviation  for 
Sp  <  2  is ambiguous. For example, suppose 
that  k = 1  and  that  bargainer  n  has  the 
utility  function 
jn  Xn  +  9n,  t 
where  n =  a, ,  and  t =  1,2,  and  suppose 
that 8a  =  =  0.49. Solving  (1) yields W  2 
0.62, and using this to solve (2') yields wi 
0.43 < S,. On the other hand,  replacing  0.49 
in the utility  functions  with 0.35 and setting 
a  =S  =  0.35,  one  obtains  wi  = 0.37. 
Therefore,  whether  &w,  is less than  or greater 
than  , when 8, < 2  depends on the values 
of the discount factors in conjunction  with 
utility-function  characteristics  undeter- 
mined by Assumptions  1-4. 
Proposition 2 predicts a first-mover  ad- 
vantage  when 8, <  ?.  In the case of 8  > 2 
a first-mover  advantage  is guaranteed  if  8a 
= S  = 1 [examine (1) and (2')]. Under  any 
other circumstances,  a  first-mover  advan- 
tage is uncertain:  from (2'), cow  ?  2  only if it 
is  the  case that  8{gCo2  ?  2.  On the  other 
hand,  satisfaction of  (1)  requires  that 
i  2(W2)?  1.  Combining these  conditions 
yields 
ip,  2  (2)  a(2  )  ?  1 
which is true only if  Sp  = 8a  =  1. 
Both the Ochs-Roth  and Guth-Tietz  data 
sets  exhibit  clear  shifts  in  opening 
offers as discount factors are varied. The 
comparative  model accurately  predicts the 
19When  ?S  a  =a3  = 1,  a  slight  modification  of  the 
proof shows that the stated equilibrium  outcome is 
unique,  although  players  will be indifferent  about the 
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direction  of virtually  all of them20  and pro- 
vides simple intuitive  explanations.  In addi- 
tion, regularity  R5 is explained. 
PROPOSITION  3:  For  all  Sal  if  d8a  >  0 
then dw1>  0. 
(See Appendix  A for the proof.) The intu- 
ition behind Proposition 3  is  as  follows. 
Suppose the game goes to the second pe- 
riod. An  increase in  a's  discount factor 
means that a fixed proportion  of the pie is 
worth more to  a  in  absolute as well as 
relative  terms. It follows that ,3 can reduce 
the share of the second-period  pie that she 
offers and still get the offer accepted (i.e., 
w)2 increases).  Therefore,  to ,3, the value of 
the  period-2 subgame increases, meaning 
that a must increase  his first-period  offer in 
order to get it accepted. 
A  generalization of  the  intuition for 
Proposition  3 leads to the following. 
PROPOSITION  4: Suppose  that 8a  < 
SP.  If 
d8a?d8i  > 0,  then dc1>O. 
(See Appendix A for the proof.) Both the 
pecuniary  and the comparative  model pre- 
dict that ,3's equilibrium  share  will increase 
as S. increases. 
PROPOSITION  5:  For all  Sp, if  d8,  >0, 
then dc1>  0. 
(See Appendix  A for the proof.) The intu- 
ition for Proposition 5  is  as follows. An 
increase in  Sl3 decreases the comparative 
value to  a  of  any period-2 split. Conse- 
quently,  W2  must decrease.  However,  as the 
math shows, W2 decreases at a slower rate 
than 8.  increases. Consequently,  S.W2  in- 
creases, implying  [look at (2')] that w1 must 
rise. 
Write col(8a, 813)  to denote that the value 
of  w  1 is dependent on both discount fac- 
tors. The comparative  model yields a pre- 
diction of what will happen when bargain- 
ers' discount factors are switched, as they 
are from cell 1 to cell 2. 
PROPOSITION  6: Suppose  that 0 < q < Q 
< 1. Then w1(q,  Q) > w 1(Q, q). 
(See Appendix  A for the proof.)  Proposition 
6 is true because, given W2(Q,q),  there is 
always a second-period  split under  (8a,  8p3) 
=  (q, Q) that  makes  both  a  and  ,3 better 
off. Consequently  a  must offer ,3 more in 
the  first period when  (8a,  813) =  (q, Q) than 
when  (8aS  813) =  (Q, q).  Comparing  cells  1 
and 2,  the  observed mean offers are as 
Proposition 6 predicts, and the difference 
across cells is statistically  significant  at all 
conventional  levels (Table 2). 
C.  Incomplete Information 
As  described above,  the  comparative 
model assumes  that subjects  have complete 
information about  one  another's utility 
functions.  In reality, however,  they do not. 
More  specifically,  although  somewhat 
roughly, the marginal rate of  substitution 
between absolute and relative money most 
likely varies by  individual, making utility 
functions  private  information.  The observed 
dynamics  of the experimental  cells suggest 
an explanation  for how subjects  handle this 
problem. 
Suppose that each a  bargainer  is either 
risk-averse  or risk-neutral.  If there exists a 
first-period  proposal  of {k  or more, which 
both maximizes  the expected  monetary  value 
of the game and is the minimum  proposal 
acceptable  to all ,3 bargainers  (with proba- 
bility 1), then such a proposal should be 
preferred  to any other by all a bargainers. 
20In the  case  of  the  Ochs and Roth  study, I made 
my comparisons on the basis of the final round of play. 
The only observation that is inconsistent with the the- 
ory  is  that  for  Ochs  and  Roth's  two-period  cells  in 
which the discount factors are flipped. However, judg- 
ing from the  figures in their paper, the  observed  dif- 
ference  in the  average opening  offers for round 10 is 
not  statistically  significant.  Cells  1  and  2,  however, 
provide an example that is consistent with the theory, 
and the  shift in offers  is statistically significant at  all 
conventional levels. 
21For  the  moment,  suppose  bargainers  are  risk- 
neutral. Then,  a's  expected  utility  function  over  the 
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Intuitively,  the reason for expecting  the two 
conditions  to overlap  is that offers that are 
rejected lead to very small payoffs relative 
to those that are accepted, so even a small 
probability  of  rejection greatly diminishes 
expected  value. 
The data corroborate this intuition. In 
Figures 8-10,  average earnings for a  are 
plotted against  opening offers to p (Tables 
3-5 show the acceptances  and rejections  for 
these opening offers).  The plots for cells 1, 
3, and 4 (Figs. 8, 10) are all very similar, 
having  peak values right around  an offer of 
$4.80  (40 chips).  For cell 2 (Fig. 9), the peak 
value is around $5.75 (48 chips). As shown 
in Tables  3 and 5 (cell-3 portion),  for cells 1, 
3, and 4, offers of greater  than or equal to 
$4.80 were  almost always accepted (only 
one exception in 90 observations).  In every 
other column  there is a substantial  percent- 
age of rejections.  For cell 2 (Fig. 9, Table 4), 
the offer with the highest  expected  payoff  is 
about $5.50, and offers at  or  above this 
value were accepted 93.5 percent of  the 
time, with a much  more substantial  percent- 
age  of  rejections for lower offers. Thus, 
while  the  offer with  maximum expected 
value is not literally  acceptable  every time, 
such an assumption  seems reasonably  accu- 
rate. 
Proposers  do not know the offer with the 
peak expected value when they begin play, 
so they must search. Searching  can be con- 
ceptualized  as a fairly  straightforward  exer- 
cise in hill-climbing,  made even easier if 
proposers  assume (correctly)  that the offer 
with maximum  expected value is also the 
minimum  offer that is accepted  with proba- 
bility 1. Then, searching  proceeds roughly 
as follows. Based on a subject's  priors, he 
makes an offer. If it is rejected,  he makes a 
more generous  offer in the next round;  if it 
is accepted,  his offer is less generous  in the 
next round. If searching is over a single- 
peaked  hill, one would expect  the process  to 
converge  on the peak. 
A smoothing  of the curves presented in 
Figures 8-10  shows that they may all be 
thought  of as single-peaked.  The observable 
implication  is that experience  should  lead to 
a greater  concentration  of offers  around  the 
peak expected value. Actually, some evi- 
dence of this has already  been mentioned:  it 
happens that mean offers, at least for the 
later rounds of play, correspond  closely to 
the  offer that  maximizes expected value 
(compare  Figs. 1, 2, and 5 to their counter- 
parts in Figs. 8-10).  The standard errors 
around  the mean offer shrink  when moving 
from cell 1 (inexperience)  to cell 4 (experi- 
ence). Another  way of seeing this is to note 
how, in Figure 8, the dispersion of offers 
shrinks  when moving  from cell 1 to cell 4. 
Table 3 displays the  distribution of open- 
ing offers for  each  cell,  by  a  bargainer. 
Across cells 1 and 4, the distributions  of 
opening offers, by category,  are quite simi- 
lar (a slightly  higher proportion  in cell 4 is 
concentrated in the upper two categories 
A((1 -  xj)k,  1) = (1-  xj)k.  Let F,(xl)  = Pr{first-period 
offer of x 2 x1 will be accepted  by a randomly  chosen 
,/}. Then, the expected  utility  to a  from proposing  xl 
is given by 
F,(x1)A((l  -  xj)k,  ai,l(xl))  + (1-  F,(xl)) 
X max{A(Qa(l  -  W2)k, ia,2(AW2)),  A(O, 1)) 
where W2  is the (expected)  second-period  equilibrium 
proposal.  Restricting  attention  to the discount  factors 
used in the experiments,  it can be shown  that 3,W2k  < 
2k,  meaning that  a  may restrict consideration  to 
x1 < 1. Then, the expected utility to a  from proposing 
x1 can be written  as 
Fg(x1)(1-  xj)k  +  (1-  F,(xl)) 
Xmax{A(Q5a(l -W2)k,  ia,2(W(2)),  A(O, 1)) 
where max{A(Ga(  -  w2)k, ia 2(C2)),  A(O,  1)} E [0, 2k]. 
Therefore,  a rough  approximation  of a's expected  util- 
ity is given  by 
F,(xl)(1  -  x1)k  + (1-  F,(xl))  'k 
(i.e., a's expected  utility  is approximately  equal to the 
expected  value of his first-period  proposal.  Let x4 be 
the offer that maximizes  expected  value. If x4 maxi- 
mizes this expected  value and Fg(x*) = 1, then risk- 
averse  proposers  should  prefer  x1 as well. 1114  THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW  DECEMBER 1991 
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TABLE  3-OPENING OFFERS  BY  a PLAYER:  (B.,  =  (2, 4) 
A. Direct  money  split: 
Value  of opening  offer  (dollars)  Total 
Cell  ?  $3.84  $3.96-$4.08  $4.20-$4.68  < $4.80  earnings 
1 (inexperienced,  8 rounds)  aaaa  a  aaa  $56.40 
aa  aaaaaa  $53.40 
aaaaaaaa  $51.36 
xxa  aaaaa  $46.08 
x  xaa  aaaa  $44.72 
xxxaaa  a  a  $43.48 
x  x  aaaaaa  $42.00 
xx  xxa  a  aa  $28.44 
a total  0  12  4  35 
a+ x total  4  19  6  35 
4 (experienced,  7 rounds)  a  aaaaaa  $50.52 
aaaaaaa  $49.20 
x  aaaaaa  $44.24 
xaaaaaa  $42.96 
xxxaaaa  $33.28 
xxxxaaa  $27.76 
xx  xxxxa  $15.32 
a total  0  4  5  25 
a+x total  2  12  9  26 
B. Toumament: 
Value  of opening  offer  (points)  Total 
Cell  ?384  396-408  420-468  2 480  points 
5 (inexperienced,  7 rounds)  aaaaaaa  5,544 
aaaa  a  aa  5,304 
aaa  aa  aa  5,280 
xaaaaaa  4,896 
xxaaa  a  a  4,484 
aaaaaaa  4,200 
aaaaaaa  4,200 
a total  3  15  10  18 
a+x total  5  15  11  18 
7 (experienced,  6 rounds)  aaaaaa  4,968 
aaaaaa  4,824 
aaaaaa  4,776 
aaaaaa  4,752 
aaaaaa  4,752 
xaaa  aa  4,056 
a total  9  26 
a + x total  10  26 
Notes: a = accepted offer; x =  rejected offer. 1116  THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW  DECEMBER 1991 
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TABLE  4-OPENING  OFFERS  BY a PLAYER:  (85,  13p)  =  (3  2) 
A. Direct money split: 
Value of opening offer  Total 
Cell  < $4.68  $4.80-$5.40  $5.52-$6.00  2  $6.12  earnings 
2 (inexperienced, 7 rounds)  aaaaaaa  $42.00 
aaaaaaa  $42.00 
x  aaaa  aa  $37.64 
x  aaaa  aa  $36.00 
xxaaaaa  $30.01 
x  xxaa  aa  $29.20 
xxxaaaa  $27.32 
atotal  0  6  29  4 
a+x  total  1  13  31  4 
B. Tournament: 
Value of opening offer (points)  Total 
Cell  < 468  480-540  552-600  2 612  points 
6 (inexperienced, 7 rounds)  xaaaaaa  3,760 
xxaaaa  a  3,540 
xxa  aaaa  3,512 
a  xxaaaa  3,388 
xxa  aaaa  3,384 
xxa  x  aaa  2,504 
x  xxxxaa  2,204 
atotal  0  10  19  3 
a+ x total  1  22  23  3 
8 (experienced, 7 rounds)  xaaaaaa  3,696 
xaaaaaa  3,248 
xxaaaaa  3,176 
xxaaaaa  3,176 
aaaaaaa  2,856 
xxaaaaa  2,856 
xxxaaa  a  2,604 
a total  23  14 
a + x total  -  34  15 
Notes: a = accepted offer; x =  rejected offer. 
[71 percent] than in cell 1 [64 percent]).22 
However,  on a bargainer-by-bargainer  basis, 
there is  much less  deviation across cate- 
gories in cell 4 than in cell 1.23 Thus, the 
similarity  of the total distributions  is deceiv- 
ing: cell-4 a bargainers  experimented  much 
less with opening offers than did those in 
cell 1. In addition,  the table sorts  bargainers 
by their total earnings,  and in cell 4, nearly 
22Performing  Pearson's  chi-square  test on the hy- 
pothesis that the distribution  of  offers is the same 
across  categories  yields  a test statistic  of 5.0749  (d.f. = 
3). The hypothesis  cannot be rejected at any conven- 
tional  level of significance.  Since  there is no theoretical 
justification  for the category  definitions,  the test has 
little statistical  power,  but nonetheless  it provides  some 
idea of how much variation  there is between the two 
distributions. 
23In fact, taking the absolute value of the difference 
between first- and last-round offers for each player, the 
average for cell 4 is approximately $0.16 (less than 1.3 
chips),  while  the  average  for  cell  1  is  approximately 
$1.16 (about 10 chips). 1118  THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REWEW  DECEMBER 1991 
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all of the offers of the four bargainers  mak- 
ing the most money had values of $4.80 or 
more. Almost all of the offers of the three 
bargainers making the  least  money had 
lesser values. In fact, the three bargainers 
making the  least, including the  one  who 
made  nothing  but  pecuniary-equilibrium 
offers, would have made substantially  more 
money ($42.00)  by always  offering  the equal 
money split (assuming  this would always  be 
accepted-a  reasonable assumption,  judg- 
ing from  the data). 
The four top bargainers  appear to have 
been aware  of the information  contained  in 
Table 3: offers  below $4.80 get turned  down 
a substantial  proportion  of the time,24  and 
since rejections  are very costly, it is best to 
keep offers at about $4.80. This informa- 
tion, however, appears to be unevenly  dis- 
tributed  among  experienced bargainers, 
possibly  due to the fact that some may have 
been ,3 bargainers  in cell  1 or may have 
participated  in cell 2, where the discount 
parameters  were different,  and hence their 
experience  was not quite as helpful. For a 
few cases, other explanations  may be  re- 
quired.25 
The description  of the dynamic  process  as 
one  of  hill-climbing  roughly characterizes 
the behavior  of most subjects.  The vast ma- 
jority only move their offers up when they 
experience rejection and move them down 
only after acceptance,  albeit, some are very 
24It might be objected that the a  bargainer  who 
made the most money  in cell 1 also made a substantial 
number  of pecuniary-model  equilibrium  offers. Note, 
however,  that the other  players  who made  a substantial 
number  of equilibrium  offers  all finished  in the bottom 
50 percent in terms of money earnings.  In short, the 
bargainer  who made the most money  got lucky. 
25Unfortunately,  it is very difficult  to trace individ- 
ual bargainers  from  inexperienced  to experienced  cells. 
However,  due to particular  circumstances,  it was possi- 
ble to track  the perfect-equilibrium  bargainer  of cell 4 
(who made $27.76). He  made mostly perfect-equi- 
librium  offers in cell 1 (and made $43.48).  Apparently 
his experience  in cell 1, in which he was rejected  43 
percent  of the time, did not have  much  of an impact  on 
his thinking.  One possible explanation  is that, due to 
the luck of the draw,  he was actually  paid for two of 
the rounds in cell 1 in which his perfect-equilibrium 
offers  were accepted  (almost  $16 total).  He was not so 
fortunate  in cell 4 (making  less than $5). VOL. 81  NO. 5  BOL TON: COMPARATIVE  MODEL OF BARGAINING  1119 
TABLE  5-OPENING  OFFERS  BY a  PLAYER,  (28,  8  )  =  (3,  3) 
A. Rotating positions: 
Value of opening offer  Total 
Cell  < $3.84  $3.96-$4.08  $4.20-$4.68  ?  $4.80  earnings 
3 (inexperienced, 11 rounds)  aaaa  a  a  $37.56 
a  a  aaa  $35.28 
xaaaa  $34.32 
xaaa  a  a  $33.24 
x  aaaaa  $31.36 
aaaaaa  $31.08 
aa  x  aa  $30.40 
aaaaa  $30.00 
x  xxaa  a  $26.20 
xaaaaaa  $25.80 
x  xxaa  $22.48 
xx  a  aa  $21.84 
atotal  0  18  5  30 
a+x  total  2  26  7  31 
B. Truncation: 
Value of opening offer  Total 
Cell  < $3.84  $3.96-$4.08  $4.20-$4.68  ?  $4.80  earnings 
9 (inexperienced, 8 rounds)  aaaaaaaa  $46.20 
xa  xaaaaa  $42.84 
xa  xaaaaa  $42.60 
xxaaaaaa  $40.92 
xa  x  xaaaa  $35.52 
x  x  xxaaaa  $25.92 
xxxaa  x  xa  $22.56 
xxxxxxxa  $7.92 
a total  0  3  2  33 
a+x  total  1  16  6  41 
Notes: a = accepted  offer; x =  rejected offer. For cell  3 (rotating positions),  because 
there were  11 rounds, half the subjects made one more proposal than the other half. 
For the purpose of comparability, earnings for the last round, in which proposers were 
randomly chosen,  are omitted. 
slow to change (similar observations  were 
made by Ochs and Roth [1989]). 
D.  Changing the Value of the Pie 
It is easy to show that, if the value of the 
pie (k)  is increased,  then the value of the 
first-period equilibrium offer (w1k) must 
also increase [from equations (1) and (2)]. 
The interesting question, however, is how 
the w1 term shifts. The comparative  model 
does not offer a clear-cut  prediction.  As an 
example of the type of additional  assump- 
tion  necessary to  get  determinance, let 
Bl(&o1)  be shorthand for Bl(co1k, c,1[1  -  &),]), 
and similarly  let  B1(W2)  be shorthand  for 
Bj(80&o2k,  1). 
PROPOSITION  7:  Suppose that  B1(o)= 
B1(co2) and suppose that  t) > 850.  If dk > 0, 
then dwo <0. 
(See Appendix  A for the proof.) For exam- 
ple, when B's utility  function  is quasi-linear 
in the  absolute money variable, B(wo1)  = 
B1(W2). In such a case, the marginal  rate of 
substitution  between absolute and relative 
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(i.e., the amount  of absolute money that ,B 
is  willing to  exchange for  more relative 
money is independent  of the initial  value of 
the  pie).  Consequently,  when  w  1>  S.,  an 
increase in  the  value of  k  allows for  a 
decrease in the proportion  of the pie of- 
fered to [B. 
For the more general  case, the movement 
of w1 as k increases  is indeterminant.  How- 
ever, the comparative  model does shed light 
on the determining  factors: from the per- 
spective of a ,3 bargainer,  an increase in k 
has the impact of increasing  the utility he 
expects  if the game  progresses  to the second 
period [i.e., the value of the right-hand  side 
of  (2')  increases]. Therefore, whether  01 
rises or falls depends on a kind of income 
effect: it depends on how [3's  relative pref- 
erence for absolute and relative money is 
affected  by a rise in the level of reservation 
welfare. Thus,  O1 rises if fairness (relative 
money)  is a "normal"  good and falls if it is 
an "inferior"  good. 
So far the discussion  has assumed com- 
plete information.  Under incomplete infor- 
mation, there may be additional  considera- 
tions:  if fairness  is an inferior  good for most 
but not all bargainers,  w, might  not fall and 
might even rise. To see why, recall that in 
cells 1 and 4, 40 chips appears to be the 
optimal  offer. If chip values increase,  inferi- 
ority of fairness for most ,B's implies that 
fewer  bargainers  will reject  offers  just under 
40. On the other hand, as the value of the 
chips increases so  do the losses to  an  a 
bargainer  from a rejected  offer (losses rela- 
tive to a "noncontroversial"  offer like 40). 
Even if the probability  of  a rejection de- 
creases,  it may  be optimal  for a to continue 
to offer either the same or maybe even a 
slightly larger proportion of  chips. It  all 
depends  on the new expected-value-of-offers 
curve  in conjunction  with a's risk posture. 
How w, will shift is ultimately  an empiri- 
cal question.  There is little relevant  data.26 
E.  Truncation Games 
A test of whether bargainer  preferences 
are correctly  specified by the comparative 
model is provided  by cells 9 and 10. In these 
cells, a's second-period  option of rejecting 
,B's offer was removed, in effect giving ,B 
dictatorial  power over second-period  settle- 
ments.  The comparative  model predicts  that 
any second-period  split will have ,B taking 
all 100 chips. 
In the  case  of  (8a,8)=(2j)  the  com- 
parative-equilibrium  first-period offer  for 
the truncated  game is greater  than that for 
the nontruncated  game: for the truncated 
game, equation  (2') becomes 
B(&olk,i0(ol))  =  B(1k,1). 
Let (o'1, oj)) be the equilibrium of the corre- 
sponding nontruncated game. The  offers 
must satisfy 
B((c)'4k,  i  (W))  =B(8  cofk, 1) <B(  k, 1). 
The inequality  follows because, in the non- 
truncated  game, ,B's  second-period  equilib- 
rium  offer must give a a positive  amount  of 
the pie. It follows that  oi > co'1. 
In the  case  of  (a,  d)=  (1,  2),  the  com- 
parative  equilibrium  is identical to the pe- 
cuniary  equilibrium:  for the truncated  game, 
equation  (2') becomes 
B(wlk,i  1(cO1)) = B(2k,  1) 
and w,=  =2  is the unique  proposal  satisfying 
the equation. 
Intuitively,  the truncation  lowers the cost 
of relative  money  faced by ,.  Consequently, 
,B will demand more relative money (i.e., 
a's  first-period  equilibrium  offer must be 
greater  in the truncated  case). 
Note that the only effect truncation  has 
on pecuniary-model  predictions  is to narrow 
the set of equilibria  from  two to one. There- 
fore, an alternative hypothesis is  that no 
change will result from the truncation.  The 
truncation of  second-period play was the 
only design feature that differentiated  cells 
26In Guth and Tietz (1988), the size of the pie is 
varied,  but no clear  trend  emerges.  Also, I do not think 
the study  yields an appropriate  test of the hypothesis, 
because  ending  the game  in disagreement  was the only 
disadvantageous  counteroffer  allowed. VOL. 81 NO. 5  BOL TON: COMPARATIVE  MODEL OF BARGAINING  1121 
TABLE  6-MODEL  PREDICTIONS  AND 
TESTS:  TRUNCATION 
Predictions (comparative model only): 
/ug >  /  and  A9  > /4 
A1? = $8.04 (67 points) 
Tests: 
Hypothesis (Ho)  t statistic  d.f. 
/L9  A  l  2.736  13.5 
,U9 <,U4  2.153  12.0 
/U10  = $8.04  0.000  7.0 
Notes:  ui=  observed  opening  offer  in  cell  i.  All  t 
statistics  were  calculated  using  means  and  standard 
errors from the last round of the cell(s). Welch's two- 
mean  test  was  used  for  two-mean  comparisons  (see 
Bickel and Doksum,  1977 pp. 218-9). 
9 and 10 from their respective  counterparts, 
cells 1 and 2. 
First, consider  cell 9. The statistical  tests 
of  the  comparative-model  predictions of 
opening  offers  are presented  in Table 6, and 
the information  is displayed graphically  in 
Figure 5. The observed mean offer in the 
last round  of play is greater  in cell 9 than in 
either cells  1 or 4,  and the difference is 
significant  at all conventional  levels. Figure 
10 shows why a  bargainers  increased  their 
offers:  whereas  ,3 bargainers  in cells 1 and 4 
almost  always  accepted  offers  of 40 chips or 
more, in cell 9  they began turning down 
offers of less than 45 chips on a fairly  regu- 
lar basis (24 percent  of all offers  between 40 
and 44 chips  were turned  down).  More than 
39 percent of all initial offers were turned 
down (see Fig. 6), and all but one of these 
was for more than the pecuniary equilib- 
rium,  meaning  that, for all but one case, no 
advantageous  counteroffer  was even possi- 
ble. Seven of eight 13  bargainers  made dis- 
advantageous  counteroffers.  In all 25 rele- 
vant observations,  B3's  counteroffer  gave  him 
all  100 chips, so  the  comparative model 
performs  well in cell 9. 
In cell 10, the observed mean offers for 
the  last two rounds are identical to  the 
point prediction  of the comparative  model 
(Fig. 11). In fact, in these rounds  there were 
only two offers that differed from the pre- 
Truncation 
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mean minus 2 standard errors 
LI  minimum observed  offer 
-------  equal division 
pecuniary  equilibrium 
interval 
FIGURE  11.  MEAN  OBSERVED  OPENING  OFFERS, 
TRUNCATION:  (8.,  8p)  = (3,  2) 
diction:  one for one chip more and one for 
one chip less. 
Cell  10  affords an  opportunity to  test 
whether  bargainers  have the types  of prefer- 
ences that are postulated by the compara- 
tive  theory. Bargainers are  assumed, all 
other things  equal, to prefer  more money  to 
less, meaning  (a) ,B bargainers  should turn 
down all offers  of less than 67 chips and (b) 
all second-period  offers should have ,B de- 
manding  and receiving  all 100 chips. Of the 1122  THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW  DECEMBER 1991 
Truncation 
Cell 10 (Inexperienced) 
4  1~~~~~~  17 
6 4  26.6% 
3- 
DE=  2  LA  157  29.4% 
z 
0 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
Round 
2: 3,2 
Round-by-Round  Cell Totall 
rejected first-period offers  E  rejected first-period offers/observations 
disadvantageous  counteroffers  disadvantageous counters/rejected first offers 
rejected second-period  offers  rejected 2nd offers/rejected first offers 
2: 1,1 = 2 disadvantageous  counterproposers:  1 per proposer 
FIGURE 12. REJECTED  OFFERS,  TRUNCATION:  (8,'  8a)  =  (4,  2) 
20 first-period  offers of less than 67 chips 
made to ,B, 12 were turned down. Of the 
eight accepted,  just one deviated  more than 
two chips from the equilibrium,  and only 
two others deviated by more than a single 
chip (the average  deviation  was two chips  or 
$0.24). Thus, while there seems to  have 
been some token altruism,  (a) appears  to be 
reasonably  consistent  with the data. Of the 
17 initial offers that were rejected, all but 
three (made by two bargainers)  were fol- 
lowed by /8 taking  all of the chips (average 
second-period  offer to  a  was slightly less 
than two chips;  (see Fig. 12), so (b) appears 
to be reasonably  consistent  as well. 
Assumption  4 of the comparative  model 
asserts that, once bargainers  have achieved 
parity with their bargaining  partners,  they 
are no longer concerned  with relative  com- 
parisons,  only  with earning  more money.  An 
alternative  hypothesis  is that bargainer  util- 
ity is actually  monotonically  increasing  over 
the entire domain  of the relative  argument. 
The difference  is significant  because, while 
weaker  versions  of most of the propositions 
Truncation 
Cell 10 (Inexperienced) 
9- 
8 
7  7 
co 
5  6 
w 
3-  3 
-CL 
0 
39  44  49  54  59  64  69 
Offer  (chips) 
-  *  observed  average 
------  pecuniary equilibrium  prediction 
FIGURE 13.  AVERAGE  EARNINGS  FOR  a, 
TRUNCATION:  (8a,  8f3)  (3X 3) VOL. 81 NO. 5  BOL TON: COMPARATIVE  MODEL OF BARGAINING  1123 
TABLE  7-OPENING  OFFERS  BY a  PLAYER,  TRUNCATION:  (8a,  p)  =  (3,  2) 
Value of opening offer  Total 
Cell  < $7.08  $7.20-$7.92  $8.04  $8.16  earnings 
10 (inexperienced, 8 rounds)  aaaaaaaa  $31.68 
aaaaaaaa  $29.76 
xaa  xaaa  a  $24.36 
xaa  xaaaa  $24.12 
xxaaaaaa  $23.76 
x  xxa  aaaa  $19.96 
x  xa  xaaa  a  $19.80 
xxxx  xaa  a  $13.52 
a total  0  8  29  10 
a + x total  6  14  34  10 
Notes: a = accepted offer; x =  rejected offer. 
in Section II would still hold, Proposition 2 
would  be  lost.  Cell  10  provides  a  test.  If 
Assumption  4 is valid, then  offers of  67 or 
more chips should  always be  accepted.  On 
the other hand, if utility is always monotoni- 
cally increasing, then  one  would expect of- 
fers of  67  chips  to  be  turned  down,  since 
doing  so  (and  taking  all  100  chips  in  the 
second period) would cost /8 only $0.04 (i.e., 
for the cost of just $0.04, /8 can obtain the 
highest possible relative value; see  Fig. 13). 
Of the  44 offers in cell  10 that were  at or 
above 67 chips, only five were rejected (see 
Table  7).  All  of  those  rejected  were  for 
exactly 67 chips,  and these  came  from just 
two /8 bargainers. Neither of these bargain- 
ers was  consistent:  each  accepted  67 chips 
on one occasion. Further, each accepted the 
one  offer  of  more  than  67  chips  that  she 
received: one for 69 chips and the other for 
70 chips.  Even  if these  two bargainers did 
receive utility for relative comparison values 
greater  than  parity,  the  additional  utility 
from achieving the highest relative compari- 
son possible would appear to be worth little 
to them-less  than $0.36. Assumption 4 ap- 
pears to be reasonably accurate. 
III.  Extended Version of the Comparative Model 
A.  Intuition 
The  assumption  that  a  bargainer's wel- 
fare is determined, at least in part, by com- 
paring the  slice  of  pie  he  receives  to  that 
received  by those  with whom  he  splits the 
pie  is  key  to  the  comparative  model.  An 
interesting implication of this assumption is 
that the behavior of the bargainer might be 
manipulated by changing the identity of his 
fellow  pie-slicers.  Consider,  for  instance, 
placing the  standard two-period bargaining 
game  in  a  tournament  in  which  each  a 
bargainer's payoff depends  on how success- 
ful  he  is  at bargaining relative  to  other  a 
bargainers (same for /,'s).27A  bargainer now 
shares  a  payoff  pie  with  his  bargaining 
counterparts,  rather  than  his  bargaining 
partner, in the  sense  that a larger slice for 
one  a  means the other a's will have less to 
share (the same is true for /3's). The way for 
a bargainer to obtain as large a relative slice 
as  possible  is  to  maximize  his  bargaining 
earnings  (i.e.,  the  bargainer  should  never 
make disadvantageous counteroffers). Since 
everyone will be  doing the  same, the pecu- 
niary equilibrium should result. 
B.  Formal Model 
Formalizing these  ideas  requires  a  little 
notation.  A  two-period  alternating-offer 
bargaining game, g, consists of two players, 
27 
A  similar device was employed by Roger  C. Kor- 
mendi and Charles R. Plott (1982) in a different sort of 
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a  and f3, playing either the direct-money- 
split or truncation  game for 100 chips (note 
that the definition  of g is distinct from the 
payoff  function  which assigns  monetary  val- 
ues to the chips obtained). Define a  bar- 
gaining round-robin as the quintuple, 
G = (g,N,M(t),S,  H}; 
where 
g is a two-period  alternating-offer  bargain- 
ing game; 
N =  {1,...  , n} is the set of bargainers; 
M(t) is a mechanism,  matching  bargaining 
partners for each round (t = 1,2...  0), no 
two bargainers matched together more 
than once; 
S = {sI(si,  .5.  ., sn)} is the strategy set induced 
by {g,N, M}; and 
H  is the monetary payoff function,  H(s) 
Rn, s E S. 
Let  U = {U1,  . . ., Un} be  the  bargainers' 
utility functions defined over  the  payoff 
space H(S). {G,  U} constitutes  a noncooper- 
ative game. Since no  two bargainers are 
ever  matched together more  than once, 
{G,  U} is finite. Without loss of generality, 
M(t) may  be taken  to determine  all matches 
prior  to the start  of the round-robin. 
A  bargaining  round-robin  may be com- 
posed of several smaller  bargaining  round- 
robins.  A  component  is  a  bargaining 
round-robin  that  cannot  be decomposed  into 
smaller  ones. For example,  for cells 1-4 and 
9-10, each two-person  bargaining  game is a 
component. Only bargaining  round-robins 
with a unique decomposition  will be consid- 
ered. 
Suppose that G is composed of compo- 
nents  G1, ...  , GC,  ...  ,  Gr;  where  Gc = 
{gC, NC,  MC(t),  SC, HC}. Let Pc be the Pareto 
frontier  of HC(SC).  A pie, D, is a subset of 
Nc such that (a) FjE1  DPj  is constant  for all 
p E PC, and (b) there is no subset of D  that 
satisfies (a). Intuitively,  bargainers  share a 
pie if a bigger slice for one means that the 
others necessarily receive a  smaller slice. 
Attention will be  restricted to  bargaining 
round-robins  in which, for any component, 
GC, the set of all pies, KC,  is a nonintersect- 
ing cover of NC. 
A description  of U requires  a characteri- 
zation of the appropriate  comparative  in- 
dexes. This, in turn, requires  a theory  about 
what relative yardstick bargainers use  to 
measure their earnings. My conjecture is 
that each bargainer  compares his earnings 
to those of the bargainers  with whom he 
shares a pie. Suppose that j E D E KC.  De- 
note a comparison  index by ij(qD),  where 
qD  is the payoff vector associated  with D. 
Let {D1,...  , Dr} be the set of pies that bar- 
gainer j  participates  in dividing  during  the 
course of G. Then bargainer  j's utility  from 
receiving (qjP,  .. ., qPJr)  is given by 
Uj(qPi  +  *Di  +  q 
ip,  iDr 
For cells 1-4 and 9-10, each two-person 
bargaining  game is a component.  All of the 
results derived in Section II can be  sup- 
ported  in the extension.29 
In the tournament  cells, chips were val- 
ued in points (detailed  below). The number 
obtained by each bargainer  was totaled at 
the  end of  the  round-robin.  The  a  who 
obtained the most points relative  to all a's 
received a fixed first prize, the a  with the 
second-most  points received a fixed second 
prize, and so forth (the same was true for ,3 
bargainers).  Each tournament  therefore  has 
only one component  with two pies: one con- 
tains all a bargainers;  the other contains  all 
28KC is a nonintersecting  cover of Nc  if (i) for all 
D, E E KC,  D n E =0  and  (ii) for j E NC,  j e D for some 
D E KC. 
29A  simple  way to do this is to suppose  that each a 
has a utility  function  of the form 
Ua,(q  DI  +  ...+  qDril.ir 
-  A(qPI,iPI)  +  +  A(qjD,  iP). 
Suppose 8's utility  function  is additively  separable  in 
the same  manner.  Both A(*) and B( ) satisfy  Assump- 
tions 1-4. As in Section  11-B,  bargaining  partners  take 
each other's utility function as common knowledge. 
Then, the equilibrium  of the round-robin  game  can be 
constructed  directly  from  the comparative  equilibria  of 
the individual  games. All derivations  of Section 1I-B 
are valid  in the extension. VOL. 81 NO. 5  BOL TON: COMPARATIVE  MODEL OF BARGAINING  1125 
,3 bargainers. Since each pie contains more 
than  two  bargainers,  it  is  difficult  to  say 
exactly what characteristics the  comparison 
indexes should have. Even if the indexes are 
completely specified, there is a further prob- 
lem:  there  are  several ways to  extend  As- 
sumptions 3 and 4 beyond the two-bargainer 
case.  Fortunately,  in  order  to  specify  the 
equilibrium of the  tournament, these  ques- 
tions  can  be  finessed:  very weak  assump- 
tions  are  sufficient.  Invoke  Assumptions  1 
and 2 plus the following two assumptions. 
ASSUMPTION  5:  iP(pD)  is nondecreasing 
in  Pj;J  E D,DE{a,3,}. 
ASSUMPTION  6:  Uj is nondecreasing in iD; 
j E  D, D  E {a,  f8}. 
Note  that Assumptions 5 and 6 are weaker 
versions of Assumptions 3 and 4. 
It will be assumed, in the following proof, 
that any time  a bargainer is indifferent be- 
tween accepting or rejecting an offer of zero 
chips, the  offer is rejected with probability 
1.  This  rule  allows  for  the  "uniqueness" 
result.  Note  that  the  solution  concept  is 
trembling-hand  perfect  equilibrium.  Be- 
cause of the nature of the information sets, 
there  are no proper subgames in a tourna- 
ment round-robin. 
PROPOSITION  8:  Let 
G = {g,N,M(t),S,H} 
be a tournament bargaining round-robin. The 
unique perfect  equilibrium for  G  has  each 
bargainer playing  the pecuniary equilibrium 
of the bargaining  game g. 
PROOF: 
The  proof  makes  use  of  the  facts  that 
weakly  dominated  strategies  are  never 
played  in  perfect  equilibrium  and  that  all 
perfect  equilibria  are  sequential  equilibria 
(see  David  M.  Kreps  and  Robert  Wilson, 
1982).  Since  players  compare  themselves 
to  their counterparts and not  to  their bar- 
gaining  partners,  tournament  utility  func- 
tions  are  nondecreasing  in  the  number  of 
points  accumulated  during  the  course  of 
the round-robin. 
Consider the final round of play and the 
information  set  at which  a  responds  to  a 
given  second-period  offer.  Because  it  is  a 
weakly  dominant  strategy,  in  any  perfect 
equilibrium, a  accepts an offer of a positive 
number of  chips with probability 1 and, as 
assumed, rejects an offer of zero chips with 
probability 1. Now consider the information 
set  at  which  /3  makes  the  second-period 
offer.  Sequential  equilibrium requires that, 
in  conjunction  with  Bayes's  rule  and  a's 
strategy  choice,  B3's strategy  choice  must 
maximize her expected  utility. Since  a  will 
accept  any  positive  offer  but  reject  zero 
chips,  offering  one  chip  and  keeping  the 
rest for herself  is  /3's unique  perfect-equi- 
librium strategy. Now consider the informa- 
tion  set  at  which  /8  decides  whether  to 
accept  or  reject  a's  first-period  offer.  By 
once more applying the requirements of se- 
quential equilibrium, it can be seen that /3's 
unique perfect-equilibrium strategy is to ac- 
cept  any offer greater than or equal to the 
pecuniary-equilibrium  offer  and  to  reject 
otherwise. 
Now  move  to  the  next-to-last  round  of 
the tournament. Iterated application of the 
above reasoning completes  the proof. 
C.  Tournament  Cells 
Cells  5-8  were  "tournaments": subjects 
played  the  basic  bargaining  game,  except 
now  they  negotiated  over  points.  In  each 
game,  the  first-period value  of  each  chip 
was 12 points. For cells 5 (inexperience) and 
7 (experience),  (&3,  b)  =  (2, 3),  so for a  and 
,f  second-period  chip values  were,  respec- 
tively,  8  and  4  points.  These  values  were 
reversed in cells 6 (inexperience)  and 8 (ex- 
perience).  As  with  the  direct  money  split, 
bargainer roles were not changed during the 
session,  and each  a  played each  8  exactly 
once. Individual points were summed across 
games, and totals were private information30 
30A subject's accumulated total was displayed on the 
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until the conclusion of  the session, when 
they were announced without attribution. 
Payoffs  were made according  to the number 
of total points a bargainer  accumulated  rel- 
ative to other bargainers  having the same 
type (a or p8).  The a who obtained  the most 
points relative to  all  a's  received a fixed 
first  prize,  the a with the second-most  points 
received a fixed second prize, and so forth 
(the same  was true for ,B  bargainers).  Payoff 
schedules  were provided  to subjects  prior  to 
play and were identical for both types (see 
Appendix B). Payoffs  were designed to be 
comparable  to the actual payoffs made in 
the direct-money-split  cells with respect to 
maximum,  minimum,  and mean. Tied bar- 
gainers received the average  of the awards 
assigned  to the positions in which they fin- 
ished. Experienced  subjects  were recruited 
in much the same way as for cell 4 (see 
Table 1 for breakdown). 
Table 8 displays  the predicted compara- 
tive-equilibrium  bargaining splits for  the 
tournament  games. They are the same (in 
terms of chips) as those predicted by the 
pecuniary  model for the analogous direct- 
money-split  game. 
Figure 1 presents (graphically)  informa- 
tion about the  average observed opening 
offers for cells 5 and 7. Offer behavior in 
the inexperienced  tournament  cell and the 
inexperienced  direct-money-split  cell is very 
similar.  However, with experience, tourna- 
ment subjects play in accordance  with the 
predicted  equilibrium.  In fact, in cell 7, the 
observed  means  are virtually  identical  to the 
prediction and have very low standard  er- 
rors. These observations  are all confirmed 
statistically  (see Table 8). 
The equilibrium  prediction  for cells 6 and 
8 are rejected at all conventional  levels of 
significance  (Table 8). Nevertheless,  Figure 
2 displays  movement  towards  the predicted 
equilibrium  as bargainers  gain experience. 
The movement is particularly  notable be- 
cause in  cell  8  the  observed mean offer 
crosses the fifty-fifty  monetary  line (i.e., on 
average, the  first-mover  advantage disap- 
pears). 
Thus, a  behavior is clearly different in 
the tournaments,  and so is ,B  behavior:  there 
is only one disadvantageous  counteroffer  in 
TABLE  8-MODEL  PREDICrIONS  AND 
TESTS:  TOURNAMENT 
Predictions: 
A55 =  ,U7 =  396-408  points (33-34  chips) 
A6  =  A8  =  792-804  points (66-67  chips) 
Tests: 
Hypothesis (HO)  t statistic  d.f. 
,US= 408  0.934  6.00 
,U5 =  396  1.219  6.00 
A7  = 408  -2.443  5.00 
U7 = 396  -0.349  5.00 
A6  =  792  -  9.768  6.00 
A8  = 792  -5.621  6.00 
Al  =  A5  -0.171  8.37 
4=  A7  4.018  7.55 
P-2 =  A6  -0.127  11.38 
/J-2 =  /J18  -1.546  9.72 
Notes:  ,u=  observed  opening  offer  in  cell  i.  All  t 
statistics  were  calculated  using  means  and  standard 
errors from the last round of the cell(s). Welch's two- 
mean  test  was  used  for  two-mean  comparisons  (see 
Bickel and Doksum,  1977 pp. 218-9). 
cell 5 and none in cell 7. While there are 
several  disadvantageous  counteroffers  in in- 
experienced cell  6,  there  is  only one  in 
experienced  cell 8. Final rejection  rates are 
also generally  much lower than in the di- 
rect-money-split  cells. 
The dynamics  that were developed  earlier 
can be applied  here as well: as in the direct 
money split, a  bargainers search for the 
offer that returns  them the highest  expected 
value. Now, however, /3 bargainers  are not 
willing to make disadvantageous  counterof- 
fers. Consequently,  a  bargainers  are led to 
perfect-equilibrium  offers.  The movement  is 
visible in the data:  in cell 5, the peak of the 
average-observed-earnings  curve has shifted 
to the equilibrium  prediction,  and it is actu- 
ally just below this in cell 7 (Fig. 8). The 
story is somewhat  more complex  for cells 6 
and 8. Note that, with experience,  the earn- 
ings  peak moves  forward  across  the fifty-fifty 
split line and that the distribution  of offers 
moves forward  with the peak. (Tables  3 and 
4  tell  the  same story on  a  disaggregated 
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The dynamics  suggest that, if play in cell 
8 were iterated a few more times, maybe 
offers  would move to the predicted  equilib- 
rium. In order to  test this, eight subjects 
were invited to play a series of  five new 
tournaments,  all identical  in design  to cell 8. 
Subjects  were randomly  chosen from a list 
of those who had participated  in at least 
two  prior tournaments (superexperience). 
The new tournaments  were run in a single 
session, but the procedures  were otherwise 
identical  to the previous  ones. In particular, 
subject types  were  randomly reassigned 
prior  to each tournament.  New tournament 
payoff schedules were comparable to  the 
previous  ones in terms of maximum,  mini- 
mum, and mean. At the conclusion  of the 
session, two  tournaments were  randomly 
chosen for payoff. 
The results of the superexperience  tour- 
naments are  summarized in  Figure  14. 
Opening offers in the first tournament  are 
very similar  to those in cell 8, but over the 
next four tournaments  they converge  to the 
fifty-fifty  split. Therefore, the  equilibrium 
prediction fails. Nevertheless, behavior in 
these  tournaments is  very different from 
that in the direct money split (cell 2). In 
particular,  over the course of the five tour- 
naments there is not a single disadvanta- 
geous counteroffer,  nor is there a first-mover 
advantage. 
Of course,  these data  may  imply  that there 
is  a problem with the comparative-model 
extension.  On the other hand, they may be 
indicative of  a  flaw in  the  experimental 
tournament  design:  in the new tournaments, 
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usually rejected the  counteroffer. A  ma- 
jority of these rejected counteroffers  came 
in  tournament 2  and were  spread fairly 
uniformly  among three of the four a  bar- 
gainers. Suppose that tournament-2  a  bar- 
gainers,  upon  experiencing a  rejection, 
concluded that the number of points they 
were offered (usually around 80) was not 
sufficient  to change how they finished rela- 
tive to other a  bargainers  and, therefore, 
not  sufficient to  change their payoff (re- 
member  that they were unaware  that other 
a bargainers  were experiencing  similar  dif- 
ficulties). Being  otherwise indifferent, it 
would not be surprising  if these a bargain- 
ers rejected  in order to hurt the 13  who put 
them in this situation  (lexicographic  prefer- 
ences of this sort would not be inconsistent 
with the comparative  model). As a result of 
this experience, f8 bargainers might con- 
clude that, in the future, they should reject 
only if there exists an advantageous  coun- 
teroffer  giving a  a very substantial  number 
of points. This would allow a bargainers  to 
be  more aggressive.  Indeed, after tourna- 
ment 2, first rejections  quickly  tail off, and 
opening offers settle down to fifty-fifty. 
The reason such scenarios are possible 
has to  do with the ordinal nature of the 
design of the tournament  payoff schedules. 
Since only the order of finish counts, a few 
points may not  make a  difference in  an 
individual's  payoff.  The extended compara- 
tive model does not include such a feature. 
This incongruity  between experiment and 
theory could be  avoided by paying each 
subject according  to the proportion  of the 
total points accumulated  by bargainers  of 
the same type for which she is responsible. 
For example, if a  bargainers  make a total 
of  100 points and a given a  bargainer  is 
responsible  for 30 of those points, then he 
would receive 30  percent of  the  payoff 
money allotted for a types. 
It should  be stressed  that the tournament 
data, discreteness  and all, are very different 
than the direct-money-split  data. In particu- 
lar, experienced  tournament  players  do not 
make  first-period disadvantageous coun- 
teroffers, while  experienced money-split 
players  do. Moreover,  the direction  of data 
shifts is always  consistent  with the predicted 
direction,  and in one case, the point predic- 
tions are accurate. Thus, by several mea- 
sures, the extended comparative  model is a 
good,  if  somewhat rough, description of 
tournament  play. 
In addition,  there is some evidence  against 
one possible alternative  explanation:  in the 
tournaments,  the payoff  schedules  for a and 
13  bargainers  are identical  and, hence, more 
equitable, at least in the sense of opportu- 
nity, than they are in the direct  money split, 
where randomly  assigned  a bargainers  have 
a first-mover  advantage.  Thus, in the direct 
money split, f8 bargainers  compensate for 
the inequity of opportunity  by demanding 
equitable splits, while in the tournaments, 
they are content to take as many points as 
they can get, since doing so does not mean 
that they must settle for a smaller  payment 
than the  a  bargainers.  This possibility is 
tested, albeit indirectly, by cell  3,  where 
subjects  took turns  being a bargainers,  thus 
having equal opportunities to  exploit the 
first-mover  advantage.  If the hypothesis  were 
true, one would expect to  see  pecuniary- 
equilibrium  results in cell 3, but this is not 
the case (see Section I-E). 
IV. Conclusions 
The  key  idea  driving the  comparative 
model is that bargainers  appear to desire 
fairness for themselves,  treating  fairness  for 
their partners as their partners' problem. 
Obtaining  fairness does not appear to be a 
moral imperative:  subjects  consider the pe- 
cuniary  price and have varying  reservation 
values. Bargainers  making proposals must 
take this into consideration or suffer the 
consequences.  In fact, coping  with this situ- 
ation is the dominant  strategic  aspect of the 
game. The resulting behavior can be cap- 
tured  in  a  subgame-perfect-equilibrium 
model in which  money  and fairness  (relative 
money)  are incorporated  into bargainer  util- 
ity functions  as substitutable  goals. 
The comparative  model fits well with the 
qualitative  regularities  observed  in previous 
experimental  studies.  In the experiments  re- 
ported here, it predicts  accurately  when dis- 
count factors are  switched between pro- 
poser and responder. It also predicts well 
when the second-period  accept/reject node 
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designed  to test alternative  explanations.  In 
the resulting  data, there is no evidence that 
greater subject experience leads to  pecu- 
niary-equilibrium  play. In fact, with experi- 
ence, mean offers remain  unchanged,  while 
standard errors shrink. Nor is  there evi- 
dence that the equity of the experimental 
design has explanatory  power. 
Standard-model  equilibrium  results were 
obtained in both a truncation  game and a 
tournament.  The amount of money avail- 
able in these games  was comparable  to that 
available in  the  direct money split. This 
implies  that nonstandard-model  play cannot 
be  attributed to  capriciousness resulting 
from insubstantial  payoffs.  This is not to say 
that there  would  be no change  if the amount 
of  money bargained over were increased. 
From the perspective of the comparative- 
model analysis,  any such change pivots on 
whether  fairness  is a "normal"  or "inferior" 
good, and if inferior,  the risk posture of a 
bargainers  may also be a factor. What, if 
any, change  would occur is presently  a mat- 
ter of speculation  which can only be settled 
by further  testing. 
The tournaments  provide some evidence 
that behavior  can be manipulated  by alter- 
ing a  bargainer's  comparison group. The 
data have a competitive  look: there are few 
disadvantageous  counteroffers,  and in one 
case, play was almost identical to the stan- 
dard  theory's prediction. Among  other 
things, this suggests that the comparative 
model may be  quite consistent with the 
standard economic theory of  competitive 
markets,  at least in some environments. 
One might take the view that the experi- 
ments reported on  in  this  paper simply 
demonstrate  that there is an uncontrolled 
nonpecuniary variable present  in  utility 
functions.  While it is true that the nonpecu- 
niary  variable  is not suppressed  (in spite of 
the pecuniary  incentives offered), to come 
to such a conclusion  is to miss the intended 
point:  the nonpecuniary  variable  can be iso- 
lated and characterized.  The proof is that 
outcomes can be manipulated'on  the basis 
of the characterization.  Understanding  the 
systematic  influence  of this variable  on one 
class of experiments  is a step toward  under- 
standing its influence in a larger domain. 
Although  understanding  does not imply  the 
ability to  suppress,31 it  is  not  clear that 
suppression  is (always)  desirable:  to assume 
that the lab results are interesting  only if 
the nonpecuniary  variable is suppressed  is 
to assume  that the nonpecuniary  variable  is 
not significant  in the field. In fact, absent 
evidence to the contrary,  the broader sig- 
nificance  of the fairness  motive is an open 
question. 
I do not think  it prudent  to conclude  that 
subjects who make disadvantageous  coun- 
teroffers are acting irrationally  simply be- 
cause this behavior  finds no ready explan- 
ation  in  standard theory. The  fact  that 
people vote in national  elections, in spite of 
the virtually  zero chance that one vote will 
influence  the outcome, does not find ready 
explanation either. Nevertheless, voting is 
not considered  irrational.  Why are people, 
at least in some situations,  willing  to pay for 
fair treatment?  It is a key question,  as of yet 
without  an answer. 
APPENDIX  A: 
PROOFS  AND  DERIVATIONS 
PROOF OF LEMMA  1: 
Suppose the statement  is not true. Then, 
by Assumption  1 there exists open interval 
(i',  t  i' > 1, such that A2 > 0 for all i E 
(i', i") (the proof for the case of A2 < 0 is 
analogous).  Then, it must be the case that, 
for arbitrary  z, 
A(z,i")  -  A(z,i')  =e>0. 
On the other hand,  by Assumption  4, for all 
8 > 0 it is the case that 
A(z+8,i')-A(z,i')  ='>0 
and by Assumption  1, 8 can be chosen such 
that E'  <  E. Substituting  the second expres- 
sion into the first  yields 
A(z,i")  -  A(z  +  8,i')  =  -  o0 
31Understanding may  imply  methods  for  suppres- 
sion.  For  instance,  the  tournament  design  may  be 
thought of  as a restructuring of  bargaining payoffs in 
an effort to suppress fairness concerns (although I find 
it  more  useful  to  think  of  the  design  in  terms  of 
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which contradicts  Assumption  4. The proof 
for utility  function B is analogous. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION  1: 
Define  x*  by  a(1 - X)=8p4x*.  Mono- 
tonicity implies  that  A(a(l  -  x*)k,  1)> 
A(O,  1). It follows from continuity  that there 
exists 0)2  satisfying  (1). Let 
x4 = max[58,&)2  12] 
Consequently, x41(1-  x4)  ?  1. By mono- 
tonicity, 
x* 
B  d  '  -1  > B(5  cok ,1) 
By continuity  there exists (D1  <  x4 satisfying 
(2'). 
That (02  is the unique subgame-perfect- 
equilibrium  strategy  starting  in the second 
period is clear from the monotonicity  of the 
utility functions. The only thing to worry 
about with to1 is that it might be the case 
that 
A(8a(1  -  (02)k,i,2(  C)2)) 
> A(1-(Oj, ia,  (1())). 
That is, a prefers  the second-period  offer  to 
offering to1 in the first period, implying  an 
incentive to deviate. To see that this can 
never happen,  consider  two cases: 
Case  1:  58o2  '  2.-From  (2')  it  follows 
that to  = 813  o2. Since 0 < 83  < 1, 
(t)2  >  t1  =  1-t  l  1-  ()2  >  8a(1?02) 
Thus, in absolute  terms, a gets more in the 
first period. On the other hand, from  o, = 
58,02  and 1-  ol >  a(1  -  (02),  it follows  that 
~a,i(1i)  =  1  8a(1  02)  i(?  )  Ct1  t,  02) 
which means that a also gets more in com- 
parative  terms.  Therefore,  a prefers  receiv- 
ing  0t1 in the first  period to receiving 0t)2 in 
the second. 
Case 2:  58,2  < '.-In  the second period, 
,8 never receives  less than a, so 
J'  1-  &2)  2 
On the other hand, from (2'), it must be 
that to, <  2  or equivalently  1-  ao)  >  2.  Com- 
bining  inequalities, 
1-  tol  >  2a(1-  2) 
Thus, in absolute  terms, a gets more in the 
first period. Since to, <2  then i 
and therefore,  in comparative  terms, a gets 
at least as much in the first period. It fol- 
lows that a prefers  receiving  co1  in the first 
period to receiving 0t)2 in the second. 
Formal derivations  of Propositions  3, 4, 5, 
and 7 require the total differentials  of (1) 
and (2'): 
(Al)  [  akAi  8,2A2j  dw2 
+  a(1W- 2)Al  dk 
+  [(1-G  2)kAl +  A2] da 
51(2 
Sa(1W-2) 
-  2w  A2 d8 
(A2)  IkB1(w1) +  1)2  da 1 
+ [w1jBj(w1)  - 8b  2B1(w2)] dk 
=  w2kBl(w2) d81 + 83kB1(W2)  dW2 
where  Bl(o1)  is  shorthand notation for 
Bl(olkk,to,/[l-to1])  and  Bl((o2)  is  short- 
hand for B1(8,too2k,  1). 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION  3: 
Reduce (Al)  and (A2) by setting dk= 
d8p = 0.  Signing  the  terms  of  (Al)  yields 
dco2  > 0. The proposition  is then established 
by signing  the terms of (A2). 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION  4: 
Reduce  (Al)  and (A2) by setting  dk = 0. 
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The proposition  is then established  by sign- 
ing the terms of (A2). 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION  5: 
Reduce (Al)  and (A2) by setting dk= 
d5a =0.  Use (Al)  to substitute d(o2 out of 
(A2). Signing  the result proves the proposi- 
tion. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION  6: 
Let  42 =  w2(Q,  q). Choose A such that 
q 
QA=q&2  k= Q  2 
and since q < Q, then A  E (0,1) and is well 
defined  as a potential  offer. In fact, think  of 
A as a potential second-period  offer when 
(,a  3)  =  (q, Q). Note  that A has been  cho- 
sen to give 13  the same money value under 
(q, Q) as c4  does under (Q, q). Recall that 
in the second period, f8  never  offers a more 
money than p receives.  Consequently, 
qtok  > Q(1-  to*)k  =: to*  > Q 
(Q2 -  q2)4)* > Q2 -  Qq 
=,q(Q  - qo*) > Q2  Q2(* 
q 
=  l-q  ,W  >  Q(l  -  *) 
In absolute  terms, a gets more money from 
q(l -  A)k than  from Q(1 -  to4)k. Also, since 
A  was chosen  so that 13  gets the same  amount 
under either set of discount factors, it fol- 
lows that a  prefers A from a relative  point 
of view as well. This means that 
A (q(l1-A)  k,  a 
>A  q(l-w*)k, 
=A(O, 1). 
The continuity  properties  of  A  imply that 
there exists  an equilibrium  offer  A*  (q, Q) > A 
such that QA*  > qw4. Therefore,  relative  to 
the  game with  (5a  8 )=(Q,q),  a's  first- 
period equilibrium  ofi&er  in the game with 
(8a,  8,3)  = (q, Q) must be greater. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION  7: 
Reduce (Al)  and (A2) by setting d5a= 
d8b = 0. Use (Al)  to substitute  dw2 out of 
(A2). By suitable rearrangement  of the re- 
sulting equation, it is clear that the coeffi- 
cient of dk will be positive  if 
(01  -  62  - 
NO-  02)  >  0 
which simplifies  to  t1 > 5.,  and this is as- 
sumed true. The proposition follows from 
signing  the terms of (A2). 
Appendix B: Experiment Materials 
Instructions 
Below are the complete instructions  (exact transcript)  for the tournament  cells (5-8). 
Alterations  for nontournament  cells appear  in brackets.  Italicized  sections were read aloud 
just prior  to the beginning  of the experiment. 
Welcome to Simulab! Please read the instructions  carefully. If at any time you have 
questions  or problems,  raise your hand and the monitor  will assist  you. From now until the 
end of the experiment,  communication  of any nature,  with other participants,  is prohibited. 
This experiment  is part of a study having to do with bargaining  behavior. During the 
experiment  you will participate  in a series of bargaining  games. For each game, you will be 
matched  with one of the other participants  present in the room. You will never  be matched 1132  THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW  DECEMBER 1991 
with the same person  more than once. All matches  will be anonymous:  you will not know  the 
identity of  the person you are matched with, nor will they know yours, nor will these 
identities  be revealed  after the experiment  is completed. 
Each game is played by one "Alpha" player and one "Beta" player.  If you are an Alpha 
player for  one game,  you  will be an Alpha player for  all games.  The same applies to Beta 
players. The actual type you are assigned to be will be determined by a coin flip just prior to the 
beginning  of  the experiment.  [For cell 3, the following was substituted for the last two 
sentences:  All participants will alternate between types in such a way that for half the games 
they play they will be an Alpha type and for the other half they will be a Beta type. (If we play 
an odd number of games, then types  for the last game played will be established by the flip of a 
coin.)] 
Each game consists of  two playing periods. During these periods, players take turns 
proposing  ways to divide between them 100 (abstract)  chips. In Period 1, Alpha proposes  a 
division.  If Beta accepts  this division  the game ends and each player  receives  the number  of 
chips designated  by Alpha's proposal.  However,  if Beta rejects  Alpha's proposal,  the game 
proceeds  to Period  2 and now Beta proposes  a division  of the 100 chips. If Alpha accepts  the 
new division,  the game ends and each player receives the number of chips designated  by 
Beta's proposal.  However,  if Alpha rejects  the Period 2 proposal,  the game ends and both 
players  receive zero chips. 
Note that the number of chips to be split is always constant at 100. So you may always use 
100 chips in a proposal. You may use less than 100 chips, if you like, but you may never use 
more than 100 chips. 
Each chip has a point value. [For all non-tournament  cells: Each chip has money value.] 
Alpha's chip values may differ from those of Beta's and chip values are always  higher in 
Period 1 than in Period 2. At the beginning  of the game, the computer  will inform  you what 
the chip values will be (the chip values will be the same from game to game). Bargaining 
partners  will know each other's  chip values as well as their own. 
You can calculate  the value of a proposal  to'  you by multiplying  the relevant  chip value to 
the number  of chips that you will receive  if the proposal  is accepted.  For example,  suppose  a 
Period 1 proposal  calls for you to receive Z chips and your Period 1 chip value is P Points 
per chip [for all non-tournament  cells: P dollars  per chip].  Then, provided  it is accepted,  the 
proposal's  worth to you is (P x Z) Points [dollars].  A totally analogous  calculation  deter- 
mines the value of the proposal to your bargaining  partner. For your convenience, the 
computer  will automatically  calculate  and display  the value of any  proposal  for both you and 
your bargaining  partner.  Scratch  paper and a pen have been provided  to you for any other 
calculations  that you might  wish to make. 
At the completion of each game, fill out a Bargaining Record form (several blanks should be 
laying [sic] next to the computer). Completed Bargaining Records provide you with a history of 
the past games that you participated in and you may reference them at any time during the 
experiment. 
You will play enough games so that each Alpha player will be matched exactly once with each 
Beta player. At the end of the experiment,  the number of points that you receive  for each game 
will be summed up. The Alpha player and  the Beta player with the highest number of  total 
points will each receive a cash award of equal value. A smaller cash award will go to the Alpha 
player and the Beta player with the second highest number of total points, etc. A complete list of 
the cash awards has been provided to you. Note  that the cash awards for Alpha players are 
identical to those for Beta players. 
In case of a tie, the players involved will each receive the average of the relevant awards. For 
example, if two Alpha players tie for first place, each would receive a cash award equal to the 
average of  the first and second place  awards. The Alpha player with the third highest total 
points would then receive the third  place award, etc. 
[For all non-tournament  cells, the following  was substituted  for the last two paragraphs: 
You will be paid the money that you make for two of the games that you play. We will  play more VOL. 81 NO. 5  BOL TON: COMPARATIVE  MODEL OF BARGAINING  1133 
than two games. The two that you are paid for will be determined by a lottery to be held at the 
conclusion of the experiment.  Since you will not know in advance which games will count, it is 
in your interest to make as much money as you can in each and every  game played. The amount 
you make will be completely confidential. The money is yours to do with as you please.] 
[For tournament cells  11-15:  We will repeat this experiment  several times. You will be paid 
for  two runs which will be determined by a lottery at the conclusion of the session.] Since the 
amount of money you make is determined  by the total number of points that you accumulate, it 
is in your interest to make as many points as you can in each and every game that you play [in 
each and every experiment  ]. You will be paid your cash award immediately upon completion of 
the experiment. The amount that you make will be completely confidential. The money is yours 
to do with as you please. 
A  note about operating the computer: whenever it is your turn to make a proposal or to 
respond to one, you are not committed to any particular course of action until you have pressed 
the "y"  key when the  "Verification" message is on  the screen. Until then,  you  may freely 
experiment with alternative courses of  action  without any  commitment or  loss  of  options. 
However, once you have pressed the "y" key while the Verification  message is on the screen, 
your proposal or response is sent to your bargaining  partner and it cannot be recalled. So before 
pressing the "y" key, be sure to check the screen to see that the computer is sending the message 
that you think it is sending. 
In the time remaining  before the session begins,  play some practice  games. Practice  until 
you feel comfortable  with how the game is played. Be aware  that the practice  games differ 
from the real games in three ways. First, no money will be paid for the practice games. 
Second,  in the practice  games  you will be able to experience  being both an Alpha type and a 
Beta type. In the actual  experiment  you will be either one or the other every  game.  Third,  in 
the practice  games your bargaining  partner  will be the computer.  [For cell 3, the following 
was substituted  for the last five sentences:  Be aware  that the practice  games differ  from the 
real games in two ways. First, no money  will be paid for the practice  games. Second, in the 
practice  games  your  bargaining  partner  will be the computer.]  The computer's  responses  and 
proposals  are generated  randomly,  so they won't make any sense. This, however,  should  not 
deter you from  becoming  accustomed  to how the game is played  and to how data is entered 
into the computer. 
You may return  to these directions  between practice  games if you wish to do so. 
Tournament  Payoff Schedules 
Cells 5, 6, and 8: 
Alpha  Beta 
Total points  Award  Total points  Award 
Highest  $16  Highest  $16 
Second  $14  Second  $14 
Third  $12  Third  $12 
Fourth  $10  Fourth  $10 
Fifth  $ 8  Fifth  $ 8 
Sixth  $ 5  Sixth  $ 5 
Lowest  $ 5  Lowest  $ 5 
Cell 7: 
Alpha  Beta 
Total points  Award  Total points  Award 
Highest  $16  Highest  $16 
Second  $13  Second  $13 
Third  $11  Third  $11 1134  THE  AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW  DECEMBER 1991 
Fourth  $ 9  Fourth  $ 9 
Fifth  $ 6  Fifth  $ 6 
Lowest  $ 5  Lowest  $ 5 
Cells 11-15: 
Alpha  Beta 
Total points  Award  Total  points  Award 
Highest  $16  Highest  $16 
Second  $12  Second  $12 
Third  $ 8  Third  $ 8 
Lowest  $ 5  Lowest  $ 5 
Screen Facsimile and Postsession Questionnaire (Exact Transcript) 
Suppose  you are going  to play  one more round  of the game.  You are the Alpha player  and 
the computer  is the Beta player. You know that the computer  has been programmed  to 
adhere to the following strategy:  reject Alpha's Period 1 proposal only if there is some 
Period 2 proposal  which, if accepted,  would give Beta more points. 
Below is a representation  of what the screen  would  look like for this game.  At the bottom, 
fill in the Period 1 proposal  that you, as an Alpha player,  would make. 
Bargaining  Record:  you are an Alpha player 
Alpha Chip Values  Beta Chip Values 
Period 1: 12 Points  per Chip  Period 1: 12 Points  per Chip 
Period  2:  8 Points  per Chip  Period  2:  4 Points  per Chip 
All proposals  must  involve  100 chips  or less 
*  *  * 
Period 1 Proposal:  Enter the number of chips Alpha receives: 
Enter the number of chips Beta receives: 
Bargaining Record (Exact Transcript) 
Game  Bargaining  Record 
You are a (circle  one)  Alpha  Beta  player. 
Alpha Chip Values  Beta Chip Values 
Period 1: $0.12  per chip  Period 1: $0.12  per chip 
Period  2: $0.08  per chip  Period  2: $0.04  per chip 
Period 1  Alpha's  proposal  is: 
Alpha receives  chips  Beta receives  chips 
Value:  Alpha receives $  Beta receives $ 
Beta  (circle one)  accepts  rejects  Alpha's proposal. 
Period  2  Beta's  proposal  is: 
Alpha  receives  chips  Beta receives  chips 
Value:  Alpha receives $  Beta receives $ 
Alpha  (circle one)  accepts  rejects  Beta's proposal. 
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APPENDIX  C: 
A NOTE  ON  COGNITIVE  UNDERSTANDING 
It  has been  suggested that disadvanta- 
geous counteroffers  are signs that partici- 
pants did not fully understand  the game. 
The argument  seems to be that disadvanta- 
geous counteroffers  are the result  of subject 
confusion about the values of  alternative 
available  actions.  This assertion  would seem 
to be refuted by the results of the trunca- 
tion and tournament  cells, in which a slight 
modification  of  the game dramatically  re- 
duces  the  frequency of  disadvantageous 
counteroffers. Also,  the  computer calcu- 
lated the value of  all proposals and dis- 
played  them to subjects,  so it is not clear to 
me what the  source of  confusion is  sup- 
posed to be. Nevertheless,  there is the fol- 
lowing  further  evidence. 
At the end of each session, subjects  were 
asked, in writing, to  consider playing the 
game once more, as an a bargainer,  with a 
computer  as ,3 partner  (see screen facsimile 
and postsession questionnaire  in Appendix 
B). Subjects were told that the computer 
was programmed  to reject a's offer only if 
there  existed  some  second-period coun- 
teroffer that would, if  accepted, yield  (8 
more money (more points in the case of 
tournament  cells); this is just a description 
of ,'s  pecuniary-equilibrium  strategy. 
In inexperienced  cells with discount fac- 
tors  (8a,  8,3) = (,  1) (cells 1, 3, 5, and 9), 71 
percent of the participants  gave the pecu- 
niary-equilibrium  answer  (79 percent if one 
allows  for a one-chip  error).  Also, there was 
no correlation  between making  disadvanta- 
geous counteroffers  and giving the equilib- 
rium answer:  74 percent of the 23 subjects 
who  made  disadvantageous  counteroffers 
answered with  the  pecuniary-equilibrium 
response. 
Due  to  a  clerical error, participants  in 
two inexperienced  cells with discount fac- 
tors (8a  d,3)  =  (1 9 2)  (cells 2 and 6) received 
the same question  as participants  in cells 1, 
3,  and 5  (i.e.,  the  chip values were not 
adjusted  to reflect the discount factors for 
these  sessions). Nevertheless, 46  percent 
gave the pecuniary-equilibrium  answer (61 
percent if one allows for a one-chip error 
and answers that gave the reverse of the 
equilibrium,  which is  the  correct equilib- 
rium for cells 2 and 6). None of the disad- 
vantageous  counteroffers  answered  with the 
pecuniary-equilibrium  response, but there 
were only four such bargainers.  Participants 
in cell  10 received the question with the 
same discount  factors  that they played  with. 
Fully 100 percent answered the  question 
correctly. 
Of course, the question was not a test; 
there is no right answer. Nevertheless,  the 
answers  given indicate that a high percent- 
age of participants  were capable  of calculat- 
ing the pecuniary-equilibrium  offer. In addi- 
tion, there is some evidence  that the play of 
the preceding cell influenced many of the 
nonequilibrium  answers:  76 percent  of these 
were in the direction  of the observed  aver- 
age settlement.  A similar  trend is observed 
when moving  from inexperienced  to experi- 
enced cells: in cell 4, where average ob- 
served  opening  offers  were greater  than the 
pecuniary equilibrium, the  percentage of 
equilibrium  answers  actually  decreased  rela- 
tive to cell 1. In cells 7 and 8, where offers 
were at or closer to  the equilibrium,  the 
percentage rose relative to cells 5  and 6. 
These results suggest that some subjects 
may have interpreted  the question as a re- 
quest for advice on how to play the game 
with other people. 
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